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1.00 Income
1.01 Assignment of Income. In United States v. Basye,' Permanente,
a limited partnership consisting of over 200 partner-physicians, many
nonpartner physicians and other employees, entered into a contract with
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., to provide medical services to the
900,000 participating members of the foundation. Kaiser agreed to
compensate the partnership at a rate which was originally $2.60 per month
per member plus a payment of 12 cents per month per member to a
trust fund which would pay retirement benefits to Permanente's partner
and nonpartner physicians upon retirement.
A physician became eligible to participate in the plan after com-
pleting two years of continuous service. The trustee maintained separate
tentative accounts for each physician and payments from Kaiser were
allocated among the accounts based on a formulae which considered age,
compensation and length of service. However, the amounts allocated did
not vest until the physician attained age 65 following 10 years of
continuous service, rendered 15 years of service to Permanente, died or
became disabled. If a physician terminated prior to vesting, his account
was forfeited and redistributed among the remaining participants of the
plan. Forfeiture also resulted if, following retirement, services were
rendered to another hospital or health plan or if the doctor refused to
render consulting services to a Kaiser health foundation. Also the
tentative account could not be transferred or assigned. Upon retirement
a retirement income policy was purchased for the physician with the
accumulated value of his account.
During the four years in question neither the partnership nor the
individual partners reported as income any of the $2 million payments
from Kaiser to the trust fund or the $60,000 of interest. The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against each partner based on the value allocated to
his tentative account. The partners argued that income did not accrue
upon allocation by the trust due to the substantial risk of forfeiture and
that income should be realized only upon receipt. The Ninth Circuit,
relying on Commissioner v. LoBue,2 determined the payments conferred
no immediate benefit upon the partnership or partners because of the
risk of forfeiture and that the partnership did not have the right to
receive the payments.3
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit relied upon two
basic principles of income taxation:
[F]irst, that income is taxed to the party who earns it and that
liability may not be avoided through an anticipatory assignment of
1 United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 940 (1973).
2 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
3 Basye v. United States, 450 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 7:2
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that income and, second, that partners are taxable on their distributive
or proportionate share of current partnership income irrespective of
whether that income is actually distributed to them.
4
The prohibition against the anticipatory assignment of income, both
from personal services and from assets was developed in the following
cases: Lucas v. Earl,5 decided in 1930, held that an attorney could not
enter into an agreement with his spouse whereby all acquisitions, including
income from future services would be owned equally. Eubank v.
Helvering6 held that an insurance agent could not assign renewal
commissions to his wife, and Helvering v. Horst7 determined that a father
could not detach negotiable coupons and give them to his son while
retaining ownership of the bond.
The Supreme Court in Basye determined the income was earned by
the Partnership when Kaiser deposited the funds with the trustee in
accordance with the agreement which had as its sole motive the circum-
vention of the tax statutes. As to the taxability of the income to the
individual partner, the court reaffirmed the principle that a partnership is
a conduit, not an entity, through which the income passes. This proposition
of law is true even though the income is not distributed to the partners.8
In conclusion we can only note that the ingenious plan developed
by the taxpayers was dashed upon the rocks over very basic and
elementary principles of taxation. The decision tends to lend support
to the Proposed Regulation 9 which treats voluntary salary reductions
as income in the year the employer contributes the amounts to a
qualified pension plan. This coupled with the pension reform being
considered by both the House and Senate leaves little comfort or hope
for the physicians even upon incorporation.
1.02 Constructive Dividends. In Ofishore Operations Trust"0 the
court concluded that the measure of income to a shareholder of a
Massachusetts trust, with transferable shares and taxable as a corporation
for federal income tax purposes, is the fair rental value including
consideration for the standby value in addition to actual use of the
facility. Here the controlling shareholder used the yacht, Crows Nest IV,
on most weekends during the summer. Since no charters or other
4 410 U.S. at 447.
5 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
6Eubank v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
7 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
8 Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 281 (1938). "The tax is thus imposed upon the
partner's proportionate share of the net income of the partnership, and the fact that
it may not be currently distributable, whether by agreement of the parties or by
operation of law, is not material."
9 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1 (a) (1) (i), 37 Fed. Reg. 25938 (1972).
10 Offshore Operations Trust, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 949 (1973).
Winter, 1974]
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business use was made of the yacht, the court concluded the fair
rental value should include the value of having the yacht available to
the shareholder at all times.
In Nicholls, North, Buse Co. they found that "rental value should
not be computed only for days of recorded use since we have held that
the boat was freely available for personal use.. . ."n The problem arose
as to whether the taxpayer should be deemed to have received a
constructive dividend equivalent to the cost of the yacht, Pea Picker
III, of $68,687.72, or merely the fair rental value. The court held that
the measure of a dividend is the fair rental value if the corporation is, and
continues to be the actual owner of the facility. Fair rental value in
Nicholls was determined by comparing the rental of similar yachts.
In the case at hand the constructive dividend was increased from
$1,800 to $3,600 without any illustration or explanation as to how the
value was calculated. Also it is interesting to note that the cost (including
depreciation), of operating Crows Nest IV during the year in question
exceeded $19,000. Finally, it is submitted that the shareholder in
Ofishore Operations received a very favorable disposition of his case
in light of substantial cost of having the yacht available to him.
1.03 Use and Occupancy Insurance Proceeds. Shakertown Corpora-
tion v. Commissioner12 held that if insurance proceeds are paid for the
loss of use and occupancy of a facility as contrasted to payment for lost
profits, they are eligible for the nonrecognition provision of Section
1033. The Shakertown policy stated "Should the amounts insured
hereunder exceed the assured's net profit plus fixed charges, then... the
weekly amounts payable under the policy will be reduced.""3 This clause
was considered to be a limitation upon the insurer's liability and had
no relation to the character of the recovery.
Nine years later in Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v.
United States,14 the Court of Claims determined that monies received
under a policy section entitled "Docks-Loss of Earnings" resulted in
ordinary income as the monies intended to replace lost profits during
a shutdown of the drydock due to an accident.
The Treasury Department announced in Revenue Ruling 73-47715
that it would no longer follow the Shakertown decision. Therefore
amounts received under a use and occupancy policy, which provides for
11 Nicholls, North, Buse Co., 56 T.C. 1225, 1241 (1971).
12 Shakertown Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1960).
13 Id. at 627.
14 Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
15 Rev. Rul. 73-477, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 45, at 20.
[Vol. 7:2
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a per diem payment subject to a reduction if fixed charges plus lost profits
are less than the specified payment, result in ordinary income and are not
eligible for nonrecognition treatment under Section 1033.
1.04 Premature Withdrawal from Savings Account. Most financial
institutions offer depositors both long-term and short-term savings
accounts. If the depositor selects a long-term deposit for which the
financial institution agrees to pay a stated rate of interest, he will be
penalized for a premature withdrawal of his funds by losing the interest
for 90 days. The financial institution is required to deduct the penalty
from principal, if the interest has previously been withdrawn.
In Revenue Ruling 73-51116 the Treasury ruled that the institution
must report the gross amount of interest earned during the year,
undiminished by the premature withdrawal penalty, on the annual
information returns, Form 1099 INT and Form 1096. The taxpayer is
required to report gross instead of net interest as income on his
individual return. Regulation 1.6049-1(b) states:
[I]nterest is deemed to have been paid when it is credited or set
apart to a person without any substantial limitation or restriction
as to the time or manner of payment.., and is made available to
him so that it may be drawn at any time, and its receipt brought
within his own control and disposition.
17
Neither the statutes nor the regulations make any provision for netting.
However the taxpayer is permitted a deduction for this loss under
Section 165(c) (2) as "losses incurred in any transaction entered into
for profit." The problem is that unless the savings account and forfeited
interest relate to the taxpayer's trade or business, he is required to itemize
his deductions to obtain a benefit from the loss.
1.05 Medical Student Loan Cancellation. If a medical student
receives a loan from a state under a Medical Loan Scholarship Program
and the loan, or a pro rata portion thereof, is subject to cancellation if
the physician practices for five years in a rural section of the state, is the
amount of the cancelled debt includable in income? The Treasury
Revenue Ruling 73-25618 answers in the affirmative citing Regulation
1.117-4(c) and Bingler v. Johnson.19
In Bingler v. Johnson the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation
of the Regulations 2° which disqualifies payments in the form of scholar-
ships or fellowships which exact a quid pro quo from the recipients or
were given primarily for the benefit of the grantor.
16 Rev. Rul. 73-511, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 47, at 16.
17Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-1(b).
1s Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 24, at 7.
19 Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
20Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c).
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The cancelled loans are includable as income and do not qualify for
the scholarship or fellowship exclusion of Section 117, since the services
do not relate to education and are required to further the grantor's
objective of providing medical service to rural areas of the state.
Although not discussed, this Revenue Ruling presents a serious
precedent for treating the cancellation of National Defense Student Loans
as income. This program permits up to 50% of the loan to be cancelled if
the graduate serves as a full-time teacher at the elementary, secondary
or college level or in a curriculum position such as dean, librarian,
guidance counselor or enters the armed services of the United States.
1.06 Financial Counseling - Corporate Executive. A relatively
recent executive fringe benefit, financial counseling, has been ruled to be
an item of gross income by the Treasury. Revenue Ruling 73-13 not only
treats the financial counseling fee paid by the corporation as income,
but also subjects such compensation to withholding for F.I.C.A., F.U.T.A.
and income tax.21
However, to the extent the fees are paid for tax or investment
counseling, they are deductible from gross income under Section 212.
This makes the itemizing of deductions on the executive's personal tax
return (1040) a condition precedent to obtaining the benefits of the
deductions as set forth in the Treasury Regulations. 22
1.07 Corporate Debt-Cancelled by Shareholder. Section 61(a)(12)
requires the amount of cancelled indebtedness to be included in income.
The Regulations make an exception when a corporate debt is forgiven
by a shareholder.2
However, Revenue Ruling 73-432 points out a distinction between
the cancellation of principal versus accrued interest.24 If the corporate
debtor has previously deducted interest on its federal tax returns, income
2 1 Rev. Rul. 73-13, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 6.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1:
(g) Fees for services of investment counsel... in connection with investmentsheld by him [taxpayer] are deductible under section 212 only if (1) they arepaid or incurred by the taxpayer for the production or collection of income or
for the management, ... of investments held by him... ; (2) they are ordinary
and necessary....
(1) [E]xpenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel or expenses paid
or incurred in connection with the preparation of his income tax returns or in
connection with any proceedings involved in determining the extent of tax
liability or in contesting his tax liability are deductible.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12:
(a) The discharge of indebtedness, in whole or in part, may result in the reali-
zation of income.... In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is
indebted to him gratuitously forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a
contribution to the capital of the corporation to the extent of the principal of
the debt.
24 Rev. Rul. 73-432, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 43, at 7.
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is realized by the corporation to the extent of accrued interest for which
it has obtained a tax benefit.
2.00 Exclusions from Income
2.01 Lodging and Meals. Section 61 of the Code defines gross
income to include "all income from whatsoever source derived .. "
However, Section 119 allows an exclusion for meals and lodging furnished
to an employee for the convenience of the employer. For meals to qualify
for this exclusion, they must be furnished on the business premises of the
employer, and be furnished for the convenience of the employer. 25 If
the value of lodging is to be excluded from the employee's income, the
employee must be required to accept the lodging as a condition of his
employment in addition to the above-mentioned requirements, of being
furnished on the employer's premises and for the employer's convenience. 26
The interpretation of Regulation Section 1.119 is not as difficult
when dealing with the "condition of employment" and "for convenience
of the employer" requirements. The problem arises when the courts
attempt to define "on the business premises."
In Jack B. Lindeman27 the Tax Court examined the legislative intent
of the phrase "business premises" and found that it was intended to
have the same meaning as the phrase "place of employment" as used
in the House of Representatives' 21 version of the statute. The Regulations
contain illustrations of activities which occurred "on the business prem-
ises," i.e., living quarters provided in a home for a domestic servant and
meals served cowhands while tending cattle on leased grass lands. 29
In Commissioner v. Anderson the Sixth Circuit, reversing the Tax
Court, stated that living quarters two blocks from the business premises
were not "on" the premises: "Had Congress so intended,... it could readily
have used the words 'in the vicinity of' or 'nearly' or 'close to' or 'contigu-
ous to' or similar language, rather than say 'on' the business premises. ' 30
Mr. Lindeman was the manager of the Beach Club Hotel and for five
years lived in a four-room suite at the hotel. After a cost study, it was
decided it would be more profitable for the hotel to rent the suite and
provide other quarters for the manager. Since the hotel needed additional
parking, three lots across the street were acquired. Two of the lots were
used for overflow parking and the house on the third lot was used for the
manager's residence. As manager, Mr. Lindeman, was on duty twenty-four
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (a) (1).
2 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (b).
2 7 Jack B. Lindeman, 60 T.C. No. 64 (July 25, 1973).
28 H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1954).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (c) (2).
30 Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir. 1966).
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hours a day and frequently returned to the hotel in the evening when
problems arose. He also used an office in the residence for planning
social events for the hotel and for various telephone calls coming to
him through the hotel switchboard.
The court determined that the house, as used here, was a part
of the hotel's physical plant. Therefore "the lodging furnished petitioner
is, within the meaning of Section 119, 'on the business premises of
his employer.' "131
In the concurring opinion Judge Tannewald felt the decision of
the majority "comports within the legislative intention as to what
constitutes 'on the business premises,' ",32 but fails to define the outer
boundaries of the statute.
In all probability we will see additional litigation involving the
parameters which have been set forth by the courts in order to
differentiate between across the street and two blocks away.
In Burl J. Ghastin 3 the Tax Court addressed itself to the problem of
excluding subsistence allowances of Michigan State highway patrolmen
from gross income. This oft-litigated issue was decided in favor of the
taxpayer by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits3
4 and in favor of
the Commissioner in the First Circuit.33 Trooper Ghastin's subsistence
allowance was originally based on three dollars a day for three meals, but
was later recalculated and stated as an hourly rate. When the trooper
worked in excess of eight hours per day he was paid overtime at a rate
of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay plus one and one-half
times the hourly rated subsistence allowance. He could carry a lunch
or eat at his home, if his work assignment so permitted, although he was
considered on duty during the meal break. Further, no accounting for
meal expense to the employer was required.
3 6
The court held that taxpayer was not furnished meals within the
meaning of Section 119, since he was compensated. The Tax Court relied
on the interpretation of meals, as decided by the First
3 7 and Ninth
Circuits,3 8 legislative history39 and the Treasury Regulations
40 which re-
31 Jack B. Lindeman, 60 T.C. No. 64 (July 25, 1973).
32 Id.
33 Burl J. Ghastin, 60 T.C. No. 31 (May 22, 1973).
34 United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
35 Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
36 Burl J. Ghastin, 60 T.C. No. 31 (May 22, 1973).
37 Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
38 Tougher v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1971).
39H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, to accom-
pany H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1954).
4
o Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1 (c) (2).
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quire the employer to furnish meals "in kind" to qualify for the exclusion.
Continuing, the court held that the meals were not furnished for the
convenience of the employer since no purpose of the employer was
served. The court distinguished Morelan and Keeton where the troopers
were required to eat in public restaurants. 41
Because of the conflict among the Circuits and the Tax Court, a defin-
itive statement by the Supreme Court is necessary to clarify the problem.
2.02 Scholarships and Fellowships. Section 117 provides an exclu-
sion from gross income of amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship
grant. Subsequent regulations 42 have delineated a more precise definition
of what constitutes a fellowship for the purposes of this section and what
tests are to be applied by the courts in making determinations of whether
money received is a fellowship.
Money received by medical interns and residents during their
medical training at medical institutions and hospitals has been the subject
of varied interpretations by the courts. Recent decisions in this area
are illustrative of the difficulty in formulating a precise definition of
a fellowship grant.
In Leathers v. United States,43 the Eighth Circuit allowed an exclusion
under Section 117 to a resident physician for money he received from
the University of Arkansas Medical Center. At issue was whether the
money paid to physicians during their residency was a grant to enable
them to receive advanced medical training or, was the money paid as
compensation for services rendered to the hospital?
The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the issue was
a question of fact to be decided by the jury since there were incidents of
both employment and training. The .jury decided that the payments were
made to allow the residents to pursue their studies. and advance their
training, and the Court allowed the verdict to stand. Reasons given by
Court for the finding included: 1) there was no quid pro quo extracted
from the residents by the Medical Center for the money received; 2) the
Medical Center was primarily a teaching institution for the purpose of
medical education; 3) there was no prior employer-employee relationship
between the Medical Center and the residents; 4) the work load of the
Medical Center could have been handled without the assistance of
the residents.
However, under circumstances similar to Leathers, the Fifth Circuit
reached an opposite conclusion and denied an exclusion to a surgical
41 United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(c), 1.117-4.
43 Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1972).
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resident. In Parr v. United States," the court granted a motion for
summary judgment by the government, and held that the money received
was for compensation and therefore taxable. The court relied on the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court decision of Bingler v.
Johnson.45 There, the Supreme Court laid down a "no strings" test. The
court stated that for money received to be considered a fellowship grant
the grantor must be "relatively disinterested" in the work done by the
recipient, otherwise the money would be considered compensation.
The Parr court followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hembree
v. United States46 stating that the primary purpose of the institution is not
a relevant factor in the determination of whether the amount received is a
fellowship under Section 117. The court held: "Payments made for the
'primary purpose-to further the education and training of the recipient'
are fellowship grants unless-and the unless is a big unless-the amount
provided for such purposes represents compensation." In a perhaps
somewhat prophetic aside, the court went on to note, "which is to
say, this is not the last word, only the latest."
47
Decisions favorable to physicians under Section 117 have not been
confined solely to jury trials. In a recent Tax Court decision, Frederick A.
Bieberdor, 48 a physician was allowed an exclusion for a grant from
funds of the National Institute of Health. Although the doctor spent
20%-25% of his time in a clinic with patients, the court held such
services were only a small part of a program designed for individual
study and research. The opinion also noted that the research done
by the doctor was not for the benefit of the grantor alone, but was
for the academic community in general.
Whether or not an exclusion is permitted under Section 117 as a
fellowship grant depends for the most part on whether or not there
are "strings" attached to the money received. Revenue 
Ruling 73-255 49
emphasizes this interpretation of the section and indicates the exclusion
will be denied if there is an element of quid pro quo, money for
services, attached to the fellowship.
2.03 Sick Pay. Under Section 105(d), the Code provides for an
exclusion from gross income of amounts received as "wages or payments
in lieu of wages for a period when an employee is absent from work on
account of personal injuries or sickness .. " The Treasury Department
- Parr v. United States, 469 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1973).
45Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
46 Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1962).
47 469 F.2d at 1159.
48 Frederick A. Bieberdorf, 60 T.C. No. 14 (April 24, 1973).
49 Rev. Rul. 73-255, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 24, at 6.
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has asserted by regulation that such an exclusion is not allowed after the
earliest time which the employee could have retured.
50
In Brooks v. United States,51 the taxpayer asserted that he had a
right to an exclusion under Section 105(d) until the mandatory retirement
age and not at the earliest age at which retirement was possible. Because
of a heart condition and illness, Brooks was pensioned at age 60 after
37 years of service. Even though he was eligible for longevity retirement,
it was stipulated that Brooks would have worked to age 65 but for his
illness. Brooks claimed an exclusion of $100 per week for amounts
received in lieu of wages because of illness between ages 60 and 65.
The issue presented was whether the regulation of the Treasury
Department is in conflict with the Code so as "to withdraw a benefit con-
ferred upon him [the taxpayer] by the Code Section 105(d), and as such
it is an impermissible assumption of authority by the commissioner.,
5 2
The Fifth Circuit, citing an earlier district court decision of Walsh
v. United States53 held that the automatic termination of the exclusion
"when an employee becomes eligible for service retirement ... is invalid
as adding an unauthorized restriction on a statutory benefit."
5 4 The
court felt that the money received between age 60 and 65, under
the language of the statute, was received because of the taxpayer's
absence from work due to illness.
Brooks was cited by the court in the case of Reardon v. United
States55 to allow an exclusion under Section 105(d) to an attorney who
retired from the Internal Revenue Service at age 51 due to illness and
claimed the sick pay exclusion applied till he reached age 70, the
mandatory retirement age. The Commissioner had asserted the exclusion
ended at age 60, when Reardon first became eligible to retire. A similar
result was reached for a taxpayer who had worked for the Central
Intelligence Agency in a decision by the Court of Claims.
56
2.04 Foreign Income. Under the provisions of Section 911 a
nonresident taxpayer may be allowed to exempt from his gross income
amounts received from sources outside the United States that are
attributable to payment for services performed outside the United States.
A recent decision of the Tax Court construing this section of the
Code is significant not only for the construction it gives of this section, but
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a) (3) (i) (a).
51 Brooks v. United States, 473 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1973).
52 Id. at 831.
53 Walsh v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
54 Brooks v. United States, 473 F.2d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 1973).
5SReardon v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tex R.2d 73-5199 (D.C. Colo. 1973).
56 Jovick v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5196 (Ct. CI. 1973).
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also for the broad definition of services that was delineated. In Mark
Tobey,57 the court had to decide whether a taxpayer living in Switzerland
and working in his own studio as an artist was within the provisions of
Section 911 for amounts received from the sales of his paintings. The
Treasury Department contended the money received could not be deemed
a "service" since there was no independent recipient of the taxpayer's
work; the only thing the recipients (purchasers of the paintings) obtained
were products of work-not services.
The court concurred with the Treasury stating: "The key element is
the presence or absence of capital as the income producing factor, not the
existence or non-existence of an independent recipient for the personal
service rendered by the taxpayer." The court also noted: "If the taxpayer's
personal efforts result in the creation of personal property, the gain
derived from the sale of that property is properly categorized as 'earned
income.' "58 Whether this definition is applicable outside of Section 911
remains to be seen, but the inclusive nature of the definition should
not be overlooked.
3.00 Exemptions
3.01 Dependents. Personal and dependent exemptions are allowed
as deductions in computing taxable income, and provisions for such
exemptions are in Sections 151 and 152. Section 151(e) provides
an exemption for dependents, and Section 152(e) is concerned with which
parent is to be allowed an exemption for his or her child when the parents
are divorced or legally separated. If no provision is made in the divorce
decree or written separation agreement, the parent not having custody
of the child may claim an exemption only if:
(i) the parent not having custody provides $1,200 or more for the
support of such child (or if there is more than one such child,
$1,200 or more for all such children) for the calendar year, and
(ii) the parent having custody of such child does not clearly establish
that he provided more for the support of such child during the
calendar year than the parent not having custody.59
The question has arisen, that under the provision of paragraph (ii)
where the custodial parent seeks to clearly establish that he or she has
"provided more for the support of such child," may said parent include
the amount provided by his or her new spouse. In other words, may the
amount provided by the mother and stepfather be combined to establish
that the custodial parent (the mother) provided more for support than
the non-custodial father.
The Treasury Department recently addressed itself to this issue in
57 Mark Tobey, 60 T.C. No. 27 (May 17, 1973).
58 Id.
59 INT. REv. CoV QP 1954, § 152(e) (2) (B) (i) & (ii),
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Revenue Ruling 73-175. The ruling provides that the amount of support
provided by the custodial parent may be combined with the amount
of support provided by said parent's new spouse to meet the criteria of
paragraph (ii).60 The Treasury reasons that such a rule allows for a
much simpler means of establishing who shall be entitled to a deduction.
This ruling reverses the position of the Treasury on this issue and in
effect revokes Revenue Ruling 7119.61
3.02 Blindness. Previously, a taxpayer, claiming an exemption for
himself or his spouse not totally blind, was required to annually attach
a physician's certification stating that the central visual acuity did not
exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses or that the widest
diameter of the visual fields subtends an angle of 20 degrees or less.
62
Under a recent Treasury decision, if the physician certifies that there
is no reasonable probability of improvement in the visual acuity, i.e., the
condition is certified as "irreversible," and the examination occurred
during the taxable year for which the exemption is claimed, the additional
certifications need not be attached to the taxpayer's return in subsequent
years, provided this condition remains "irreversible.,
6 3
4.00 Bad Debt
4.01 Carrying on a Business-Definition. Different treatment is
accorded bad debts which become wholly or partially worthless during
a taxable year. If the bad debt is considered as resulting from taxpayer's
business, Section 166 permits a dollar for dollar deduction.6 This
deduction may be calculated by deducting the total debt from gross
income if the debt becomes wholly worthless during the taxable year or
by a reasonable addition to a reserve established for bad debts. If the
business debt is recoverable in part, an amount may be deducted which
does not exceed the amount charged off during the taxable year.
However, if the bad debt is found not to result from the taxpayer's
business, it must become wholly worthless before it will be treated as a
short-term capital loss.6 What constitutes carrying on a business, however,
60 Rev. Rul. 73-175, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 16, at 6.
61 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 43.
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.151-1(d)(3).
63 T.D. 7230, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 6.
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(a).
65 Id. § 1.166-5(a) (2). Since short-term capital loss treatment is accorded these non-
business bad debts, there is a $1,000 limitation onth dqductions with ar unlimited
carryover period. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1211.
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has met with some definitional difficulty and the Treasury Regulations
have avoided making a comprehensive pronouncement. 66
In Richard H. Tunstead,67 the taxpayer and his wife claimed a
business bad debt deduction resulting from a 1967 foreclosure loss. Both
engaged in the practice of purchasing several second mortgages as
investments from 1961-1967. The court found proof that they were not
engaged in the real estate business since "the time and effort ... devoted
to their real estate business was not sufficiently engrossing to meet the
standard."68 The standard was established as an undertaking to which one
habitually devotes time, attention or effort with substantial regularity. In
addition, the court pursued objective standards to support this position,
finding a failure to pay a state self-employment income tax on the interest
income received. The logic of this decision is questionable in that a
determination of federal income tax treatment appears to have hinged
on payment of a state tax, whereas, better support might be found in
a failure to pay social security taxes under the self-employment provisions
of the Social Security Act.
4.02 Stockholder's Loan to Corporation. When a corporation fails
to repay a loan from a stockholder-employee, has a business or non-
business bad debt occurred?
In United States v. Generes69 the "dominant motivation" standard
was substituted for the "significant motivation" test 70 in determining the
business/non-business aspect of the debt. The employee-stockholder was
considered as making loans to his business with two motives: to protect
his investment and to protect his employment. 71 Thus, by making the
"dominant motivation" of the taxpayer the measure, the mere presence
of a business motive will not fully control the tax result. Although,
loans made for the protection of one's job or salary may suffice for
business bad debt treatment. 72
In Odee Smith 73 the "dominant motivation test" was applied to loans
662 P-H 1973 FED. TAXES 11,010. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171
(1911) where pursuits occupying man's time, attention, and labor for livelihood or
profit purpose were identified as a business. But see, Oliver B. Kilroy, 42 P-H TAX
CT. MEM. 29 (1973), where no basis was found to support taxpayer's contention that
he was in the mining exploration business and the considerable nonbusiness income
of taxpayer was indicative of his lack of profit motive.
67 Richard H. Tunstead, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 510 (1973).
68 Id. at 511. See Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947).
69 United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972). See 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161
(1971).70 Weddle v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1963). But see, Niblock v. Comm'r,
417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
71405 U.S. at 99.
72Kelson v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5487 (D. Utah 1973).
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already made to protect the taxpayer's credit rating, and thus, his
floundering business. The court, reversing its prior application of the
significant motivation standard, found that the "dominant motive" for
the loan was to protect his investment and accordingly gave non-business
bad debt treatment to the loss. However, one loan made to the
business after it had ceased operations was found necessary to protect
the taxpayer's creditors and credit rating, resulting in business bad debt
treatment. This case is instructive as to future application of the
dominant motive test.
4.03 Accrued But Unpaid Child Support. Are bad debt deductions
allowable for accrued and unpaid child support payments which a divorced
parent, pursuant to a court decree, has been ordered to make but has
failed to perform? In Imeson v. Commissioner,4 the uncollected support
payments were not considered a bad debt within the meaning of Section
166. Since the "debt" is not derived from the capital or income of the
taxpayer it is not a true debt. 75 The obligation will be treated as
comparable to earned but uncollectable, unpaid wages, which, though
worthless, are non-deductible unless the income these items represent
has already been included in that year's income tax return or that of
some previous year.76
Two burdens of proof confront a taxpayer seeking to deduct these
accrued but unpaid expenses. First, evidence must be introduced showing
the amounts actually expended for support do not exceed the ex-spouse's
obligation and secondly, evidence must show that the debt owing became
totally worthless during the year(s) for which the deduction(s) was taken.
If the burdens are not carried, the deduction is denied presumably
because there is no out-of-pocket realized loss. 77 This rationale is
applicable not only to child support payments which are owed but
unpaid, but also to unpaid alimony obligation and various expenses
incurred in attempted collections.78
In Imeson, the court agreed that the deductibility of these "debts"
was an arguable point but refused to resolve these conflicting questions.
4.04 Intra-family Debt. Is a non-business bad debt deduction, under
Section 166, permitted for a debt, which is created pursuant to a
separation agreement and subsequent divorce, if the debt becomes
worthless in the hands of an assignee following an assignment?
74 Imeson v. Comm'r, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-6073 (9th Cir. 1973).
75 Dale A. Swenson, 43 T.C. 897 (1965).
76 5 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 30.12 (1969). See Dale A.
Swenson, 43 T.C. 897 (1965); John L. Seymore, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950). In the prin-
cipal case, the taxpayer failed to carry both of these burdens.
77 Long v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 616 (1938).
78W. Thomas Menefee, 8 T.C. 309 (1947).
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In Green F. Johnson7" the Tax-Court concluded that no deduction
would be permitted. The spouses executed a written separation agreement
containing an acknowledgment of a $4,270 indebtedness between husband
and wife including a 6% per annum interest charge that was to continue
until the principal was paid. The wife assigned this indebtedness to her
father who obtained a default judgment against the husband for $5002.60.
The full amount was deducted by the father as a non-business bad debt.
The IRS argued that there was no debtor-creditor relationship between
husband and father, and notwithstanding this premise, it further argued
that the obligation was worthless at its creation and assignment.
In order to justify a bad debt deduction it is incumbent to show a
valid debtor-creditor relationship.80 When an intra-family loan is made, it
is often considered a gift and a debtor/creditor relationship is not found.8'
The Court concluded that even though the debt was incorporated
in the separation agreement and was legally enforceable, that alone does
not automatically make it eligible for a bad debt deduction. Since
this "debt" could be considered worthless from its inception it could
not be deducted under Section 166.82
4.05 Bad Debt and Life Insurance Proceeds. If insurance is
purchased on a debtor's life, but the proceeds received following his death
are not restricted to the amount of outstanding indebtedness, may the
creditor take a bad debt deduction for the then wholly worthless
outstanding debt and further exclude the insurance proceeds from gross
income for that year? It appears that Thomsen & Sons v. United States83
opens the door to such a possibility. A manufacturer purchased "key
man" insurance on its exclusive California distributor. The distributor was
killed while still owing $48,053.97 to the manufacturer, who received
$50,444.92 in death benefits. At trial the IRS contended that the
proceeds were not paid by reason of the insured's death and were not
properly excludable. Since the proceeds of insurance nearly equated
the outstanding indebtedness, arguably the motive for the purchase was to
guarantee collectibility of the account receivable. The jury was instructed
to apply "good common sense" to determine whether the proceeds were
paid by reason of the insured's death. The jury found the proceeds
taxable and the debt totally worthless. On appeal, the manufacturer's
motive for originally purchasing the insurance was found immaterial to
the application of Section 101(a) (1), which in part provides that gross
income does not include amounts which are received under a life
79 Green F. Johnson, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 756 (1973).
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.166; see Elizabeth N. Rude, 48 T.C. 165, 172 (1967).
81 Evans Clark, 18 T.C. 780 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1953).
82 Green F. Johnson, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 756 (1973). See Eckert v. Burnet, 283
U.S. 140 (1931).
83 Thomsen & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 484 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1973).
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insurance contract paid by reason of the insured's death. The court further
found it natural that the proceeds of insurance were not limited to the
outstanding indebtedness at death.
It appears that a double benefit is possible, a bad debt deduction for
unsatisfied indebtedness and also an exclusion from gross income of the
insurance proceeds. This is especially true where a "key man policy" is
purchased and a convincing argument is presented that the insurance
is to indemnify against injury to a going business, not as an assurance of
collectibility of a receivable. It is significant to note that the IRS did
not appeal the jury finding of the non-collectibility of the debt. This may
throw some doubt on the availability of double benefits in future litigation
if a similar situation occurs.
5.00 Deductions
5.01 Home Office Expense. Section 162(a) provides in part: "There
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... "
It is this section which a taxpayer must comply with if a business
expense deduction is to be achieved. One such deduction, which has
been subject to extensive litigation in recent years, involves the right
of an individual executive or employee to deduct those expenses incurred
in maintaining an office in his home.
The Treasury has accepted for some time the right of a taxpayer
to use part of his home as a professional or business office and deduct
the portion of his rent and other similar expenses attributable thereto
as a business expense.8 4 However, the Service has attempted to impose
far stricter requirements on executives and employees before allowing
them a deduction for home office expenses.8 5
Revenue Ruling 62-180 placed the burden of proof upon the taxpayer
to establish, among other factors, that he was required to provide his
own facilities as a condition of his employment and that he regularly
used a part of his personal residence for that purpose.86
The Tax Court has often rejected the Treasury's position that the
employee must be required, as a condition of his employment, to provide
his own space in his home. It has been held, if the home office is
"appropriate and helpful" the taxpayer qualifies for a deduction.8 7
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (3).
85 Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
86 Id. at 53.
87 James L. Denison, 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1129 (1971); Christopher A. Rafferty, 40
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 887 (1971); Vin L. Dietrich, 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 715 (1971);
Stanley E. Bailey, 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 480 (1971); George H. Newi, 38 P-H TAX
CT. MEM. 735 (1969).
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The Newi case, one of the first to clearly establish the "appropriate
and helpful" test regardless of Revenue Ruling 62-180, was appealed to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.88 Mr. Newi sold advertising time
for a television network and worked at night in a den in his apartment. He
was not required or requested to set aside the space and in fact had office
space available for his use in the evenings. The Tax Court allowed a
deduction for a portion of the rent, electricity, and cleaning of his apart-
ment as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The basis of the Tax
Court decision was the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "ordinary and
necessary" standard in Section 162 as imposing only the requirement that
the expenditure be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. 89
The Commissioner argued on appeal that the taxpayer's use of the
study was purely personal and therefore was not deductible.90 He further
alleged the Tax Court's construction of the phrase "ordinary and
necessary," "would open the doors for a business deduction to any
employee who voluntarily chose to engage in an activity at home which
conceivably could be helpful to his employer's business." 9'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not believe the
Commissioner's concern was justified and held the Tax Court's decision
was reasonable under the facts of this case.
However, the taxpayer in Paul J. O'Connell,92 relying upon Newi, was
denied a deduction for his home office. The Tax Court distinguished Newi
on the ground that it was more practical for Mr. Newi to do his work at
home while Mr. O'Connell was unable to prove he "could not have
done his work at the office as well or better than at his apartment."9 3
It is submitted that the Newi and O'Connell decisions are not
distinguishable on their facts as the Tax Court believed. Furthermore, the
Tax Court in O'Connell cited with approval Revenue Ruling 62-180
and noted the taxpayer was not required as a condition of his employment
to maintain an office in his home.
In 1973, there was a continued liberalization by the courts of the
Treasury's position as to the allowance of a deduction for a home
88 Newi v. Comm'r, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g, 38 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 735
(1969). Although it can be argued Herman E. Bischoff, 35 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 603
(1966) was the first case to establish this test, the facts indicate an implied require-
ment to have a home office.
89 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966).
90 See INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
91432 F.2d at 1000.
92 Paul J. O'Connell, 41 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 874 (1972).
93 Id. It should be noted that the "appropriate and helpful" test was still followed by
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office.94 There is also an indication the Internal Revenue Service is
retreating from its position as set forth in Revenue Ruling 62-180.1
In LeRoy W. Gillis,96 the taxpayer was a district sales manager
of an insurance company. Although he was not required to, Mr. Gillis
maintained a room in his home as an office. The Commissioner did not
rely on the "employer requirement," as found in Revenue Ruling 62-180,
in arguing for the disallowance of the deduction. Instead, the government
contended the taxpayer's duties did not necessitate the maintenance of an
office in his home because his employer furnished him with adequate
facilities located near his home. Thus, it was asserted that the taxpayer's
home office was a mere duplication of his employer's facilities and as
such was not deductible by reason of Section 262.
The court held, the mere existence of duplicate facilities does not of
itself demand the disallowance of a deduction for home office expenses.
The court was of the opinion that a deduction for a home office should
be held to the same test as any other business expense. Therefore, if it is
appropriate and helpful, rather than for the mere convenience of the
taxpayer, a deduction should be allowed. The maintenance of the home
office by the taxpayer was found to be appropriate and helpful in carrying
on his duties and was more than for his mere convenience. It 
is
noteworthy that one of the factors considered by the Tax Court 
in
reaching its result was the hazards of working alone downtown at night.
In Thomas J. Green, Jr.,9 7 although the litigated issue dealt with
the taxpayer's commuting expenses, a surprising stipulation was entered
into regarding the taxpayer's home office. Mr. Green spent time in 
the
evening in his den reviewing his business activities of the day 
and
preparing for his next day's business activities. The taxpayer's reasons
for working at home were purely personal in nature; however, the 
parties
agreed the taxpayer was entitled to deduct the fair rental value of 
his den
as a business expense. As a stipulation is only binding in the 
case at
issue, it is the author's opinion that this case does not represent 
a total
reevaluation of the Treasury position.
A recent case reported, with respect to a deduction for a home
office, involved an IRS attorney who took work home from the 
office
on weekends and evenings and used a room in his apartment for 
this
purpose. 8 The taxpayer contended the claimed deduction was an ordinary
and necessary business expense under Section 162(a). The Commissioner
94 LeRoy W. Gillis, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 423 (1973).
95 Id. Thomas J. Green, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 44 (Dec. 20, 1972).
96 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 423 (1973).
97 59 T.C. No. 44 (Dec. 20, 1972).
98 Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. No. 86 (Sept. 4, 1973). The taxpayer usually worked
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contended the taxpayer must show he was required to work after hours
and that his employer failed to provide him with an adequate office toperform this work. The IRS attempted to rehabilitate Revenue Ruling
62-180 by construing the phrase "required as a condition of employment"
to mean "required in order to perform his duties." This approach wasfound to be unsatisfactory as being too strict. The court allowed thededuction for the home office finding its use appropriate and helpful
to the performance of the taxpayer's duties. Although the use of thehome office served his own convenience, this was not the primary reason
for its maintenance as it was also more efficient.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Scott recognized the precedents
for the decision but viewed the deduction as purely personal. He believed:
[N]o professional person and very few if any business people, who
would not be entitled to deduct as a business expense some portion
of the cost of rental of a home or the maintenance of a house sincethe great majority of such persons do professional reading and written
work for themselves or their employers in their homes. 99
Justices Featherston and Quealy, also dissenting, analogized the home
office deduction to the transportation of job-related materials to work.100
Justice Quealy would require the taxpayer to prove the space claimed for
the home office "would not have been acquired except for such purpose."
One may conclude from the above decisions that the Treasury's
position as to a home office deduction, as expressed in Revenue Ruling
62-180, will find little support among the courts. It appears the mostgenerally accepted test is whether the home office is "appropriate andhelpful" to the taxpayer. It is predicted that the Treasury will change
the thrust of its argument away from Revenue Ruling 62-180 toward the
Fausner approach as discussed by the dissent in Bodzin.
Once it has been determined that a deduction for a home office ispermissible, the question arises as to the proper method of calculating thededuction. The Commissioner has once again relied on Revenue Ruling
62-180 to determine the answer, wherein it is provided:
Where a portion of the residence is regularly used for businesspurposes only part of the time, a further allocation must be made
on the basis of the ratio of the time the area is actually usedfor business purposes to the total time it is available for all uses.(Emphasis added.)101
The result of employing this formula is that any calculation will be
a9Id.100 See Fausner v. Comm'r, 413 U.S. 838 (1973), aff'g, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973).
101 Rev. Rul. 180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
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based on a twenty-four-hour day since this will always be the amount
of time the room is available for use.
In George W. Gino,0 2 the Commissioner asserted the proper formula
to apply in computing the deduction was found in Revenue Ruling
72-180. However, the court held the correct method to apply "is the
ratio of hours of business use to hours of total use of the rooms in
issue." The court's rationale was that a dual-use facility is just as much
available for business as it is for non-business use when not occupied. In
other words, the proportion is the amount of hours the room is used
as a business office over the total number of hours it is actually
used during the course of a day.
The Gino case points out the great advantage the taxpayer receives
by using the court's approach. While the Commissioner argued the
deduction should be 2/24ths (the number of hours of business use
over the number of hours in a day), the taxpayer argued, and the
court accepted, that the deduction should be 2/8ths (the number of
hours of use for business purposes over the number of hours the room
was used for other activities).
In LeRoy W. Gillis,10 3 after concluding the taxpayer's home office
was appropriate and helpful in carrying on his duties, the court concluded
the office was used 80 percent for business and 20 percent for personal
purposes. The office took up one-eighth of the area of the home.
Consequently, the court allowed a deduction for depreciation based on
80 percent of one-eighth of the capital expenditure, and a deduction
of 80 percent of one-eighth of the residential expenditures.
The foregoing 1973 cases indicate the courts are also liberalizing the
Treasury position as to how the deduction will be computed. Of course, if
the home office is used exclusively for business there will be no problem
in deducting all of the allowable costs. However, a further allocation
based on use will be necessary if the office serves other purposes.
It is suggested that if the office is to be used for other than business
related purposes, such use be kept to a minimum. In addition, one should
be able to adequately substantiate business versus non-business uses with
documented evidence (i.e., timecharts). In conclusion, the expenses
related to maintaining an office in the home will generally include a
proportionate share of depreciation for the home owner or rental for
the renter; utilities; maintenance, and insurance.
5.02 Commuting--Carrying Tools of Trade. One may not deduct
the cost of commuting between his residence and place of business as a
102 George W. Gino, 60 T.C. No. 37 (May 31, 1973).
10342 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 423 (1973).
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business expense.104 However, one may deduct transportation expenses
incurred in getting from one place of business to another. 0 5 The question
arises whether one may deduct traveling expenses between one's home
office and office in the city. Thomas J. Green, Jr.,1°6 deals with this issue.
In Green, the taxpayer used the den in his home as an office. The
taxpayer contended his round-trip expenses between his Long Island
residence and Manhattan place of business was a deductible business
expense. The taxpayer contended his den and his office in Manhattan
constituted two places of work and therefore traveling between them
was not commuting. The Commissioner alleged the travel expenses
were commuting expenses and as such not deductible. The court found
for the Commissioner on the ground that the taxpayer's personal
residence was not a principal office.107 It is submitted that if one's
home can be classified as a principal place of employment, he will
meet with success in the Tax Court in deducting his expenses between
his home and an office in the city. 08
Russell Anderson'0 9 dealt with the issue whether one could get abusiness expense deduction for auto expenses incurred driving from the
union hall, where daily work assignments were picked up, and the places
of employment assigned. The court held the costs were non-deductible
commuting expenses because it was the union which imposed the
requirement of daily stops and not the employer. Therefore, the taxpayer's
traveling did not constitute business trips.
Although admittedly commuting expenses are not deductible, the
question arises whether or not a deduction is allowed if one is transporting
the tools of his trade from his home to his place of employment?
The Commissioner's original position was to disallow any deduction
for commuting expenses notwithstanding the fact the taxpayer was
also transporting tools. 1 0 The rationale was that the expenses of the
taxpayer were not incurred by the carrying of the tools; therefore,
the entire amount of the expenses were deemed to be commuting, with
no part allocable to the transporting of tools. However, the Treasury
104Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e).105 Candler v. Comm'r, 226 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1955).
106 Thomas J. Green, Jr., 59 T.C. No. 44 (Dec. 20, 1972).
107 See Mazzotta v. Comm'r, 465 F.2d 1399 (1972), affg per curium, 57 T.C. 427(1971).
108 Mr. Green based his argument on language found in "Your Federal Income Tax."
The court discounted this publication as not being authoritative law. See Dixon
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965).
109 Russell Anderson, 60 T.C. No. 88 (Sept. 5, 1973).
3 0 Rev. Rul. 25, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 152.
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position was modified in Revenue Ruling 63-100."1 Where one would
not use his automobile except for purposes of transporting the tools
of his trade, the transportation expenses are deductible.
The Court of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits have
allowed deductions for some allocable portion of traveling expenses even
though the taxpayer would have driven to work in any event.11 2 The
Second Circuit recently reaffirmed its decision in Sullivan, in Coker
v. Commissioner,13 stating that any change in its rule should come
from the Congress or the Supreme Court.
Mr. Coker claimed he was entitled to deduct his entire traveling
expense, even though he would have driven to work anyway, because
his duties as a carpenter shop steward necessitated the carrying of
200 pounds of tools. The Commissioner argued the taxpayer was not
entitled to any deduction. The court affirmed the Tax Court's allowance
of a deduction of a reasonable percentage of the commuting expense
allocable to the transportation of his tools.
Yet, in Fausner v. Commissioner,"4 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals declined to follow the view of the Second and Seventh Circuits
and affirmed a Tax Court decision disallowing a deduction in toto for
the automobile expenses incurred by a pilot transporting his flight bag
and overnight bag from his home to his place of employment." 5 The
court felt there was no rational basis upon which an allocation could
be made between the nondeductible commuting expenses and the
deductible business expense. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
settle the dispute between the circuits." 6
Mr. Fausner argued he was entitled to deduct the entire cost of his
automobile expenses on the theory they were incurred in transporting
his bags. The taxpayer did not dispute the fact he would have commuted
by automobile regardless of whether he had to transport his bags.
The Supreme Court in a per curium opinion affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's holding on the theory that the mere fact the taxpayer must carry
111 Rev. Rul. 100, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 34, wherein a musician who used his car to trans-
port bulky musical instruments, and who would not have otherwise used his car, was
permitted to deduct his transportation expenses.
112 Sullivan v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966); Tyne v. Comm'r, 385 F.2d 40
(7th Cir. 1967). The Second Circuit noted in Sullivan that if a means of storage was
feasible, the cost of this alternative should represent the maximum allowable deduction
for transportation of the tools.
113 Coker v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1973).
n4472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973).
15 Donald W. Fausner, 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1248 (1971). This same taxpayer was
allowed a deduction by the Tax Court for an allocable portion of his commuting
expenses attributable to his bags when he lived in New York. 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
(This case would have been appealable to the Second Circuit.)
11 Fausner v. Comm'r, 413 U.S. 838 (1973).
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"incidentals of his occupation" does not remove the expense from the
exclusion of Section 262. However, the court noted: "Additional expenses
may at times be incurred for transporting job-required tools and material
to and from work." The Court further stated, "in such a situation, an
allocation may be feasible.""17
It would seem the Supreme Court decision in Fausner may have gone
even further than the Treasury in disallowing a deduction for the
transportation of tools of one's trade. An analysis of the court's holding,
and in particular its reliance on Revenue Ruling 63-100 and comment
thereafter, indicates that not only does the court favor a deduction in only
those cases where the automobile would not have been used but for the
tools, but furthermore, in such a situation an allocation would be required.
The Commissioner's position, as set forth in Revenue Ruling 63-100, is
to allow a deduction for the entire traveling expenses incurred if the
taxpayer would not otherwise have used his automobile.
It is also possible to interpret the court's language as setting forth
two alternatives to gain a deduction for expenses incurred in transporting
tools. First, an entire deduction is allowable if the taxpayer can show he
would not have used his car but for the transportation of his tools.
Second, if additional expenses are incurred in transporting tools the
taxpayer would be entitled to deduct the additional expenses. Although
this alternative interpretation, quite honestly, seems to conflict with
the express language and citation of the court it is hoped the Fausner
decision is construed in this manner.
A reexamination of the Coker decision, in light of Fausner, clearly
illustrates the import of the latter case in the area of transportation of tools.
On October 17, 1973, the Second Circuit granted the government's
petition for rehearing Coker. Taxpayer's deduction was not permitted
since he would have used his automobile even if he was not transporting
his 200-pound tool box and he presented no evidence that additional
expenses were incurred.
Thomas L. Bradley,"' the first Tax Court case decided after the
Supreme Court decision in Fausner, denied a National Park Service police
officer a deduction for auto expense since the court could not determine,
from the record, that the taxpayer would have used public transportation
except for the fact he needed to carry police equipment with him.
Mr. Bradley:
[W]ore his uniform to and from work assignments, and carried with
him in his automobile the following equipment: (1) a so-called
"riot bag" or duffel bag, two or three feet long and 15 to 18 inches
117 Id. at 839. The court cited Rev. Rul. 63-100, presumably as an example of a
deductible expense.
118 Thomas L. Bradley, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 771 (1973).
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in diameter, containing boots, raincoat, helmets, gas mask, night
stick, and other items; (2) a briefcase approximately 17 or 18 inches
long, 12 inches wide, and 4 inches deep, containing traffic code books
for Maryland and the District of Columbia, ticket books, steel
measuring tape, a box of 38-caliber shells, and various other items;
(3) another briefcase of equal size, containing an emergency
blanket, a map, a general order book, and bandages; (4) a large
metal flashlight; and (5) a "rool-a-tape" measuring device 18 inches
long having a metal handle. The foregoing equipment weighed 51
pounds in the aggregate; all of it was necessary for the conduct
of petitioner's duties, and petitioner was required to keep it with
him at all times. 119
The Tax Court appears to have adopted the "except for" test of
Fausner. It is interesting that the court did not mention the aspect
of additional expenses; although it can be reasoned that with only a
51-pound load, the issue was irrelevant in the case at hand.
The final development which will be discussed in the area of
transportation expenses is Revenue Ruling 73-191.120 The taxpayer who
requested advice was an employee who drove his automobile on business
and was reimbursed by his employer at the rate of eight cents per
mile. On his income tax return, the taxpayer elected to take a business
expense deduction under Section 162(a) for the difference between the
standard mileage rate of twelve cents per mile l2 and his eight-cent-per-
mile reimbursement. There was no detailed information concerning meal
and lodging expenses included in his return.
The Commissioner determined the taxpayer did not comply with
the appropriate reporting requirements; 122 therefore, the deduction was
not allowable. The Commissioner stated the transportation expenses could
be computed by using the standard mileage ratio. However, compliance
with adequate accounting to the employer provisions of the regulations 123
could not be relied upon by the taxpayer to substantiate his deduction.
The effect of Revenue Ruling 73-191 is to place the burden on
the taxpayer who is not fully reimbursed by his employer to maintain
records and supportive evidence of all his expenses incurred if he
119 Id. at 772.
120 Rev. Rul. 73-191, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 10.
121 Rev. Proc. 25, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 506.
122 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.274(e)(2)(iii), 1.274-5(e) (3) and 1.162-17(b) (3) provide that
when an employee incurs deductible business expenses in excess of his reimbursements
from his employer he must submit a statement as part of his return indicating the
total of all amounts received as reimbursements. He must prepare a detailed
analysis of his expenses broken down into transportation expenses, meals and
lodging, entertainment and other business expenses. In addition, he must maintain
records and supporting evidence to substantiate his claim.
123 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.274-5(e); 1.162-17(b).
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wishes to obtain a deduction for those expenses not reimbursed, even
though he has already accounted to his employer.
5.03 Commuting--Distant Jobsite. In Boone v. United States,24
the court once again faced the problem of the deductibility of expenses
incurred in daily travel to and from a distant jobsite when the job is
known not to be of a permanent nature. In this case, the taxpayer claimed
that the daily commuting expenses were an allowable deduction under
Sections 161 and 162 since the job was of a temporary nature. The
district court agreed with the taxpayer and allowed the deduction under
Section 162(a) (2). The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the job was not
of a temporary nature but was of an indefinite duration and therefore no
deduction was permissible. The court of appeals cited the following
factors as relevant in its determination that the job was indefinite and
not temporary: 1) the job could be terminated at any time; 2) the
taxpayer had no way of knowing how long the job would last when he
was hired; 3) the taxpayer was actually employed 15 months.
5.04 Legal Fees--Divorce, Estate Planning, Liquidation. Section
212 provides that an individual may obtain a deduction for all
the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred "in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax."
Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with
a divorce, separation or support decree are not deductible, 125 although
those expenses incurred for tax counsel or determining tax liability are
deductible. 126 However, there must be an allocation if the expense is
incurred in an activity not solely relating to tax matters. 27 The Treasury
concedes a deduction is possible, under Section 212(3), for the portion
of counsel fee in a divorce proceeding allocable to tax counsel.
28
Sidney Merians"2 dealt in part with the deductibility of estate
planning fees. Dr. Merians retained a law firm to prepare an estate plan
for he and his wife. An attorney prepared a will taking into consideration
requirements for qualification for the marital deduction; established an
irrevocable trust; transferred stock to that trust; dissolved a corporation,
and created a partnership with the trust as a limited partner to hold the
real estate which the corporation owned. Gift tax returns were also
prepared in connection with the creation of a life insurance trust. The
taxpayer received a bill for legal services which the petitioners deducted
in its entirety from their income tax return alleging the fee was entirely
for services relating to tax matters. The Commissioner contended that
124 Boone v. United States, 482 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
125 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (7). See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
126Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1).
127 Meyer J. Fleishman, 45 T.C. 439 (1966).
128 Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 179.
129 60 T.C. No. 23 (May 8, 1973).
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Revenue Ruling 72-545,130 which dealt with the allocation of legal fees in
connection with a divorce proceeding, was applicable to the present
situation. Thus, the court interpreted their function as one of allocating
the portion of the legal fees attributable to tax advice.
The attorney's bill was not itemized and his testimony did not indicate
the amount of time spent on tax considerations in preparing the estate
plan. Although the petitioners failed to carry their burden of establishing
what portion of the fee was allocable to tax advice, 131 the majority of the
court was not prepared to accept the Commissioner's contention that
the failure made an allocation impossible. The court was convinced by the
attorney's testimony that "a significant portion of his services consisted of
tax advice." However, the court was of the opinion that because of the
vagueness of the testimony the allocation must be "weighed heavily
against the taxpayer," and allowed only a 20 percent deduction.
The majority opinion suggests that if the attorney's bill was itemized
or if the testimony was more specific a greater deduction could have been
obtained.132 Three concurring justices suggested that a further deduction
was possible under Section 212(2) as the estate planning advice was
for the management of property held for the production of income.
The opinion of the four dissenting justices in Merians must not be
overlooked. They first struck down the suggestion that a Section 212(2)
deduction was possible because they did not believe the services had an
effect on the income-producing property itself. They further were of the
opinion that the only deductible service performed under Section 212(3)
was the filing of the gift tax return. All of the other services were
considered by the dissenters to be for future events and as such
were not deductible.
Regarding the deductibility of legal fees by a corporation when a
tax-free liquidation under Section 337 is involved, there is a division of
authority among the circuits.13 The Tax Court in O Course, Inc.,
3 4 a
late 1972 decision, allowed a deduction since appeal was to the Fourth
Circuit which previously decided legal fees are deductible. The Tax
130 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 179.
131See Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969); George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688
(1968), afl'd per curium, 420 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1970).
132 Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964), wherein a 70%
allocation for tax advice towards a divorce and separation was upheld by the Court
of Claims.
133 United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Company, 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.
1966); Pridemark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), where the deduction
was allowed. Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Lanrao, Inc.
v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970);
United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385
F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1967), where the deduction was disallowed.
134 Of Course, Inc., 59 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 25, 1972),
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Court indicated that if the issue was to be decided without precedent, no
deduction would be allowed. They would treat the legal fees as a reduction
of the selling price of the corporate assets since they relate to the
liquidation, not to doing business.
5.05 Employment Agency Fees. Treasury Regulations under Section
212 disallow "expenses such as those paid or incurred in seeking
employment or in placing oneself in a position to begin rendering personal
services for compensation ... "135 However, Revenue Ruling 60-223,36
which revokes Revenue Ruling 60-158,137 states that deductions will be
permitted for fees paid to employment agencies for securing employment.
The Commissioner prevailed in Eugene A. Carter13 8 where the Tax
Court determined that expenses incurred by an officer in the United States
Air Force in seeking post-retirement employment were not deductible
and that Revenue Ruling 60-223139 was intended to permit a deduction
only when the employment agency actually secures a position for the
taxpayer. The court relied on McDonald v. Commissioner for the propo-
sition of law that Section 162(a) confines deductible expenses "solely
to outlays in the efforts or services... from which the income flows."'' 1
Since the taxpayer was an officer at the time of the expenditures, there
was no relation of the expense to his income from the Air Force.
In David J. Primuth a deduction was permitted for $3,016 of the
expenses paid to Frederick Chusid & Co. for services rendered relative
to obtaining a new position as secretary-controller with the Symons
Manufacturing Co. Prior to seeking a new position taxpayer was employed
as secretary-treasurer of Foundry Allied Industries. The court held that
the expenditure was incurred by taxpayer "in carrying on his trade or
business of being a corporate executive,"' 141 and therefore was deductible
under Section 162. The court also rejected a distinction suggested by the
IRS that fees are deductible only when they are contingent upon securing
a job and not deductible if the fee was payable whether or not a new job
was located. This was held to be a distinction without a difference.
The Tax Court in Guy R. Moto'4 reaffirmed its position as stated in
Primuth. Then in Kenneth R. Kenfield a deduction was allowed for
employment agency fees where taxpayer accepted a job offer through
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f).
138 Rev. Rul. 223, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 57 (1960).
137 Rev. Rut. 158, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 140 (1960).
138 Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
'39 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 57 (1960).
140 McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 61 (1944).
141 David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 377 (1970),
142 Guy R. Moto, 54 T,C. 558 (1970),
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the agency's efforts, but did not take the job since his present employer
increased his salary.'
43
However, in Morris v. Commissioner44 the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished "between expenses incurred in seeking and preparing for new
work, which are not deductible, and expenses incurred in securing and
performing such work, which, of course are deductible. ' 145 Here, since
the employment agency was not instrumental in obtaining employment
for the taxpayer, no deduction was allowed. Although the taxpayer
originally based his claim on both Sections 162 and 212, the case was
finally submitted for argument and decided under Section 212.
Revenue Ruling 71-308146 affirmed the Treasury's position that a
deduction is permitted only if the taxpayer is successful in securing new
employment. Leonard F. Cremona147 engaged a consulting firm to assist
in locating a new position. At all times during the unsuccessful search
the taxpayer was employed at his old job. The Tax Court was unable to
distinguish Cremona from Primuth, Moto or Kenfield and concluded that
an administrator, as well as a corporate executive or engineer, could be
engaged in a trade or business and therefore could deduct employment
agency fees incurred in an attempt to better himself.
In Miller v. United States 48 the district court held that employment
agency fees paid by an unemployed executive who remained jobless
at the time of payment were not deductible as a business expense
under either Section 162 or Section 212. The decision turned on the
issue of whether or not the expenditures were incurred in carrying
on a trade or business.
The court decided it was impossible for the taxpayer to be involved
in carrying on a trade or business when he was out of work at the time.
Here the court relied on the Ninth Circuit decision in Morris and in
effect reinstated the seeking versus securing distinction.
In the author's opinion Miller was incorrectly decided, a taxpayer
does not cease to be engaged in carrying on a trade or business merely
because he has become unemployed.
49 Also, it is important to note that
143 Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
144Morris v. Comm'r, 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'g, 36 P-H TAX CT. MEM.
1424 (1967).
145 Id. at 612.
146 Rev. Rul. 308, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 167.
147 Leonara F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972).
148 Miller v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5696 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
149 Furner v. Comm'r, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968). Holding that a professional
teacher, who took a year to obtain an advanced degree, was engaged in carrying on
a trade or business. Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963). Holding that a jewelry salesman
who worked for 25 years did not cease to be in the jewelry business simply because
he was temporarily unemployed and had no merchandise to sell,
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the IRS removed employment agency fees from its list of Prime Issues
during 1973.
It should be kept in mind that a taxpayer is required to itemize his
deductions to be entitled to a deduction for employment agency fees.150
5.06 Moving Expense. A deducation is allowed for certain expenses
incurred in moving during the taxable year in connection with the
commencement of work by the taxpayer. In Hartung v. Commissioner"
the taxpayer was denied a deduction for unreimbursed moving expenses
under Section 217. The deduction was denied as the taxpayer was moving
to Australia where his earnings would be exempt from federal income
tax. Likewise, Markus152 was denied his moving expense deduction since
the deduction would offset tax-exempt income earned while abroad.
Another taxpayer, Larry R. Adamson,153 was unsuccessful in his
various attempts to bring expenses within the provisions of Section 162.
Adamson was an attorney and a certified public accountant living in San
Francisco who left California and went to New York for nine months to
complete an L.L.M. program in taxation. Upon completion of his degree,
the taxpayer moved to Tucson, Arizona, to practice law.
Adamson claimed as deductions under Section 162 the following:(1) The amounts expended for travel, meals and lodging while at New
York University for the L.L.M. program. These amounts were claimed
as expenditure incurred while away from home to obtain education in his
field. The deduction was denied on the basis that the taxpayer had
severed his ties with San Francisco, that he incurred no additional
expenses, and that his residence for tax purposes was now New York;(2) Transportation expenses from New York to Tucson, at the rate of
12 cents a mile. The court determined the expenses were moving expenses
and were deductible only at the rate of 6 cents a mile, and (3) Expenses
incurred in gaining admission to the bar of a second state. The deduction
was again denied, this time on the basis that the benefits gained
were of an indefinite duration and were therefore capital expenditure,
not business expenses.
5.07 Education Expense. As a general rule education expenses are
deductible if the education:
(1) Maintains or improves skills required by an individual in his
employment.., or (2) Meets the express requirements of the individ-
ual's employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulation,
150 Rev. Rul. 308, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 167.
151 Hartung v. Comm'r, 484 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1973).
252Markus v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153 Larry R. Adamson, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM, 473 (1973),
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imposed as a condition to the retention by the individual of an estab-
lished employment relationship, status or rate of compensation. 15
Conversely no deduction is permitted if the education fulfills a general
aspiration, meets the minimum educational requirements of the trade or
business or qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business.1 55 Obtaining
an undergraduate degree is usually considered a personal expense in order
to fulfill a general educational aspiration and, therefore, is not deductible.
However, The Reverend John D. Glasgow was able to sustain the
burden of proof and convince the court to allow a deduction for
$2,779 of tuition, transportation and other expenses incurred while
attending an undergraduate program.
The reasons stated by the court for allowing the deductions were:
(A) he was ordained several years before commencing his education; (B)
his education extended over nine years while he devoted his primary
attention to the pastorate; (C) he did not obtain a teaching certificate
which was normally awarded to graduates of Southern State College;
(D) he took courses which would be beneficial to him as a minister; (E)
he selected his major in his last year of college merely as a condition
precedent to graduating, and (F) his congregation urged him to continue
his education and his salary had actually decreased during the three years
preceding the trial compared to his salary ten years ago. 156
The course of study undertaken by Pastor Glasgow had a direct and
proximate relationship to the skills required by the taxpayer in his
employment. This situation is in contrast with Mr. Carroll, a Chicago
police officer, who was denied a deduction for expenses incurred while
obtaining an undergraduate degree because his primary purpose was
to meet the prerequisites for admission to law school and to enter
the profession of law. 157
We should note that this case was decided under the 1958
Regulations which required the expenditures to be undertaken primarily
for the purpose "[m]aintaining or improving skills." 158 It appears the
result of this fact situation should be the same even if decided under
the 1967 amendments to the Regulation, which disallow expenses that
maintain or improve skills if they are necessary to meet the minimum
requirements of a job or qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or business.15 9
'54 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (2) & (3).
156 John D. Glasgow, 41 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 327, 328 (1972).
157 Carroll v. Comm'r, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
158 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1), as amended, T.D. 6918, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 36.
159 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.
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In 1973 Messrs. Gore,160 Wright,161 Lunsford, 162 Ruddy,163 and
Melnik 64 were apprised of the fact that the 1967 amendment to the
Treasury Regulations, disallowing educational expenses which qualify a
taxpayer for a new trade or business, has virtually eliminated any
possibility of deducting costs incurred in obtaining a law degree.
An analysis of cases decided since Treasury Regulation 1.162-5(d)
was amended in 1967, reveals that law school expenses cannot be
deducted by one who is enrolled in a full-time degree program. However,
it is the author's opinion that tuition for certain individual work-related
courses may be deductible. The Commissioner's brief in Carroll v.
Commissioner stated: "a currently employed taxpayer such as petitioner
might be allowed to deduct the cost of college courses which directly
relate to the duties of his employment."' 16
5
5.08 Education Expense-Travel. The Treasury Regulations permit
a deduction for travel as a form of education expense if it is directly
related to the taxpayer's trade, business or employment. 166 Revenue Ruling
64-176 liberalized the more restrictive 1958 Regulations to permit
deductions for sabbatical leave travel if it "has a direct relationship to
the conduct of the individual's trade or business."' 167 Most of the litigation
in this area involves teachers attempting to deduct educational travel
expenses incurred during summer vacation or while on sabbatical leave.
The basic issue which the courts must determine in these situations
is whether the travel is directly related to improving and maintaining
the taxpayer's individual skills 168 or whether it is primarily related to the
taxpayer's personal goal of broadening his prospective through travel,
sightseeing, social visiting and recreation. 169
Mrs. Krist, a first-grade teacher, was not allowed to deduct the cost
of her six-month tour of fifteen countries in Europe and Asia by freighter
around the African Coast. The court determined that the trip, although
having some educational value, was not directly related to improving the
taxpayer's skills as a first-grade teacher. The court noted that Mrs. Krist
visited classrooms during parts of five days, that she used pictures,
costumes, dolls and games obtained during the trip in her classroom
160 Oscar N. Gore, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 440 (1973).
161 Murry Jerome Wright, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 8 (1973).
162 John K. Lunsford, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 17 (1973).
163 Ruddy v. Comm'r, 474 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1973).
164 Melnik v. Comm'r, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5230 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
165 Carroll v. Comm'r, 418 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1969).
16 6 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d).
167 Rev. Rul. 176, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 87.
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a) (1).
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (c).
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presentations, and acquired the technique of using a slate and abacus.1 70
Although travel may be "directly related" to teaching duties, this is
not sufficient unless it develops or improves a specific area of knowledge
which is vital to the taxpayer's position. 171
Likewise, Ms. Cochran's $5,283.87 of expenses for a round-the-world
tour were not deductible because "cultural enrichments of a teacher and
incidental benefits to the students are not sufficient to satisfy that test."' 172
The court noted that while an extensive diary was prepared, it failed to
include any references to any teaching methods learned on the trip.
Mr. and Mrs. Elsner, graphic-art teachers at San Jose State College,
were denied a deduction for travel expenses incurred in Europe during
a six-month leave of absence. The court determined that the taxpayer's
activities differed little from those of the normal tourist and hence
taxpayers did not sustain the burden of proving that their activities
maintained or improved their skills as graphic-arts instructors. 7
In Ford v. Commissioner174 the taxpayer was allowed a business
expense deduction for travel, tuition, food and lodging incurred while
enrolled in graduate courses in Norway. The curriculum, language,
anthropology, and culture were directly related to his skills as a teacher.
It becomes clear that in order to qualify travel as an educational
expense, the travel must relate directly to the teaching position held
and be fully documented.
5.09 Lobbying Expense-Public Employee. The Tax Court in
James M. Jordan,75 a case considered to be one of first impression,
permitted taxpayer to deduct lobbying expenses. The taxpayer was
employed as a chemist for the Georgia Highway Department and, in
1967, he and five other employees organized the Georgia Highway
Employees Association (GHEA). The stated purpose of the organization
was to increase wages and to form a grievance committee which would
consider the possibility of extending the State Merit System to the
Highway Department. Taxpayer, using his own funds, published and
mailed a newsletter, made phone calls and traveled to conferences with
other GHEA members and various legislators.
The court found that taxpayer's expenses met the requirements
of Section 162(e). The requirements for deducting lobbying expenses
are as follows: (A) incurred in carrying on a trade or business;
170 Krist v. Comm'r, 483 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1973).
in1 Gladys M. Smith, 36 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 1407 (1967).
172 Carol J. Cochran, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 457 (1973).
173 Thomas Elsner, 42 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 776 (1973).
174 Ford v. Comm'r, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-6121 (9th Cir. 1973).
175 James M. Jordan, 60 T.C. No. 80 (August 27, 1973).
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(B) ordinary and necessary; (C) relate to legislation which is of
sufficient direct interest to the taxpayer, and (D) be in connection
with communications, appearances and submission of statements to
legislative bodies or political subdivisions.
The court found that "[Pletitioner's trade or business is being an
employee of the Georgia Highway Department." 17 6 The expenditures
were ordinary and necessary in that although the typical employee may
not incur this type of expense, they are of a nature which normally
would be incurred in a lobbying effort and they were related to
communications and appearances before legislatures.
To determine the question of direct interest, the court looked to the
Treasury Regulation, which states "[L]egislation or proposed legislation is
of direct interest to a taxpayer if the legislation or propsed legislation is of
such a nature that it will, or may reasonably be expected to, affect the
trade or business of the taxpayer."' 177 Since the taxpayer's efforts, if
successful, would result in increased compensation and improved working
conditions, the direct interest test was satisfied.
5.10 Substantiation Rules for Travel, Entertaining and Gift Expense.
Included in the phrase "ordinary and necessary business expense" are
expenditures for travel, entertaining and business gifts. Although these
expenditures are deductible from gross income, a serious problem arises
as to the manner of proof thereof, and as a result the taxpayer and
the IRS have been engaged in a continuing battle. The taxpayer normally
deducts expenses in excess of the amounts he can actually substantiate
by producing receipts, etc.
In 1930 the Second Circuit Court of ApI.dls recognized the problem
and established what became known as the Cohan Rule. 178 George M.
Cohan, entertainer and producer, deducted $55,000 for travel and
entertaining expenses incurred during a three-year period. The lower
court allowed no deduction since Cohan was unable to prove any amount
of expense, since no details or records were maintained by the taxpayer.
The appellate court ordered the lower court (Board of Tax Appeals) to:
[M]ake as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily upon the
taxpayer whose ineractitude is of his own making. But to allow
nothing at all appears to us inconsistent with saying that something
was spent. True, we do not know how many trips Cohan made, nor
how large his entertainments were; yet there was obviously some
basis for his computation, if necessary by drawing upon the Board's
personal estimates of the minimum of such expenses. The amount
may be trivial and unsatisfactory, but there was some basis for some
176 Id.
7 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c), (2), (ii), (b), (1), (i).
178 Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
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allowance, and it was wrong to refuse any, even though it were
the traveling expenses of a single trip. It is not fatal that the result
will inevitably be speculative;
179
The Cohan Rule continued to be the guiding light for resolving
disputes involving travel, entertaining and business gift deductions until
1962.
In 1962 Congress enacted Section 274 to curb extensive expense
account abuses. Section 274(d) disallows travel, entertaining and business
gift expenses unless the taxpayer meets the strict substantiation require-
ments as to: (A) the amount of the expense, (B) the time and place,
(C) the business purpose, and (D) the business relationship. The
taxpayer is required to substantiate the expense either by adequate
records or by sufficient evidence corroborating his own statement.
Treasury Regulation 1.274-5(c) requires "adequate records" such as
an "account book, diary, statement of expense or similar record." If the
taxpayer does not meet the requirement of adequate records, then he must
prove the elements of the expense by a written statement and other
corroborative evidence. Based on the aforementioned regulations the IRS
insisted on written evidence as a condition precedent to allowing a
deduction for travel, entertaining and business gifts.
Dr. La Forge, a surgeon at Buffalo General Hospital purchased
lunches for himself and the interns and residents who worked with
him. The cost ranged from $2.65 to $3.00 per day and Dr. La Forge
deducted $2.00 for each day he was at the hospital. Unfortunately he
maintained no records and the hospital cashier was not permitted to give
receipts. As a result, his expenses were disallowed since he could not meet
the substantiation requirements. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
contention that Dr. La Forge had failed to maintain "adequate records"
and disallowed the deductions. 80 On appeal the Second Circuit held: "To
require a written statement itemizing each expenditure is, in effect,
to compel the taxpayer to maintain 'adequate records' and thereby to
dismiss from the statute one element of its disjunctive substantiation
requirements." 181 Further, the Treasury Regulation' 82 was contrary to
the Congressional intent.183
On December 15, 1972, Treasury Decision 7226184 was filed
amending Treasury Regulation 274-5 (c) (3) (i) by striking the words "in
writing" and inserting the phrase "whether written or oral."
179 Id. at 544.
180 Harry G. LaForge, 53 T.C. 41 (1969).
181 LaForge v. Comm'r, 434 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g, 53 T.C. 41 (1969).
182 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c) (3).
183 S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
184 T.D. 7226, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 3 at 6.
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While La Forge and T.D. 7226 represent decisive victories for
taxpayers, cases subsequent to La Forge make it clear that "Even though a
written statement may not be required for substantiation, the corroborative
evidence must nevertheless establish each statutory element-amount, time,
place and purpose--of the expenditure with precision and particularity."' 18 5
5.11 Research and Development Expense. Section 174186 allows
taxpayers an option of whether to capitalize or expense expenditures for
research and development. A condition precedent to the electing to
expense research and development is that the expenditures be incurred
in connection with carrying on a trade or business. To answer the question
of what is a trade or business we turn to Justice Frankfurter's decision in
Deputy v. DuPont where it was defined as "holding one's self out
to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." 18 7 This definition
was adopted by the Fourth Circuit'8 8 and expanded by the Fifth Circuit
to cover "extensive activity over a substantial period of time."' 8 9
In Snow v. Commissioner'"0 the taxpayer, a $200,000-a-year executive
vice president for Procter & Gamble, participated through a limited
partnership in the development of a trash-burning device. Snow also
invested in two other companies. The IRS disallowed the deduction since
they determined Snow was not engaged in a trade or business, and
therefore the expenditures were nondeductible pre-operating expenses.
This opinion was affirmed by the Tax Court.
The taxpayer relied upon the Congressional intent for Section 174
to equalize small companies with major corporations. 191 After further
analysis the court found that this intent only applies to those engaged
in a trade or business. The remaining issue is whether the taxpayer, by
investing in several companies which were not at the time selling goods
or services, was engaged in trade or business. Relying on the Supreme
185 Hughes v. Comm'r, 451 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1971).
188 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 174.
Research and experimental expenditures
(a) TREATMENT AS EXPENSES-(1) In general.-A taxpayer may treat research or experimental expendi-
tures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection
with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital
account. The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction.
187 Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940).
188 Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1942).
189 Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968).
190Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), affg, 58 T.C. 585 (1966).
19197 CONG. Rc. 4326A (1951) (Remarks of Representative Camp). "[T]o prevent
tax discrimination between large business having continuous programs of research
and small or beginning enterprises...."
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Court's decision in Whipple v. Commissioner192 the Sixth Circuit
determined that Mr. Snow, by merely investing as a minority shareholder
in several businesses was not engaged in a trade or business, hence the
expenditures were not deductible under Section 174.
5.12 Partnership Expenses-Who May Deduct. Is a partner in a
law firm permitted to deduct expenditures made on behalf of the firm on
his personal tax return if he is not reimbursed by the firm? The question
can be answered in the affirmative if the partnership agreement has
been carefully drafted so as to require individual partners to assume
responsibility for certain expenses. If the partners have been negligent
and have not covered this matter in the agreement, an alternative remains,
if a partnership practice of payment by partners can be established.
93 Of
course, the burden of proving the practice falls upon the taxpayer.
In Tonkojq v. United States the taxpayer was denied a deduction for
reimbursed expenses of operating his aircraft and other travel and
entertainment expenses because "the record is [was] devoid of evidence
of a partnership understanding, agreement, or a clear course of conduct
which would bring plaintiff within the Klein holding."' 94 This case
presents a caveat not only to members of a partnership but also to
corporate executives; since, an employee is not entitled to a deduction
for any expenditure relative to corporate business if he is entitled to
reimbursement from the corporation. To eliminate this issue an agreement
should clearly spell out the partners' or executives' responsibilities for
personal payment of certain expenses. Another possibility for partners
is to have the partnership pay all expenses and to allocate all such
expenditures to the incurring partner, of course providing for this
arrangement in the partnership agreement.
Although unrelated to the deduction of business expenses, Attorney
Tonkoff contended that the government owed him for rental of office
space and for secretarial services incurred by the revenue agent during
the audit. Unfortunately the court was unable to find any basis in
192 Whipple v. Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
Devoting one's time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself,
and without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged. Though such
activities may produce income, profit or gain in the form of dividends or
enhancement in the value of an investment, this return is distinctive to the
process of investing and is generated by the successful operation of the corpora-
tion's business as distinguished from the trade or business of the taxpayer
himself. When the only return is that of an investor, the taxpayer has not
satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is engaged in a trade or business
since investing is not a trade or business and the return to the taxpayer, though
substantially the product of his services, legally arises not from his own trade or
business but from that of the corporation....
If full-time service to one corporation does not alone amount to a trade
or business, which it does not, it is difficult to understand how the same service
to many corporations would suffice.
193 Klein v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1045 (1956).
'94 Tonkoff v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-6038 (E.D. Wash. 1973).
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jurisdiction or in law to sustain taxpayer's claim. While we may smile
as to Attorney Tonkoff's contention, when we consider the space required
for revenue agents examining a large corporation over an extended
period of time the issue of renting office space and equipment to the
IRS takes on more importance. It is the author's opinion that if
the rental issue was sufficiently pressed, the agents would react by merely
requesting the corporate executive to transport all material, books,
ledgers, etc., to the local field office.
5.13 Business Expenses-Future Reimbursements. Harry M. Flower
entered into an agreement whereby he would be the exclusive sales
representative in several counties of southwest Texas. 195 The agreement
provided for the employer to reimburse Flower in 1985 for all expenses
incurred during a ten-year period developing the sales territory. The
contract also provided for earlier reimbursement dependent upon Flower's
death, disability or voluntary retirement. During the years in question the
taxpayer, relying on Section 162(a) deducted the expenses incurred in
working the territory. However, on audit the expenses were disallowed.
The Tax Court upheld the IRS's disallowance based on the well-
established principle "that where taxpayer makes expenditures under an
agreement that he will be reimbursed therefore, such expenditures are
in the nature of loans or advancements and are not deductible as
business expenses."' 196 This rule is applicable when the right to be
reimbursed is contingent and advances "made only with the expectation
that they would be substantially repaid."' 197
5.14 Used Tires and Tubes. Revenue Ruling 59-249198 provides that
the cost of tires and tubes purchased on new commercial trucking
equipment is an ordinary business expense and deductible in the year of
purchase. This ruling has been extended to allow the tires and tubes
on used construction equipment purchased to be expensed if the useful
life is less than one year. Revenue Ruling 73-357199 only relates to used
construction equipment but the same allowance would seem to apply to
used commercial vehicles of all types. If the useful life of the tires and
tubes is less than one year and the taxpayer can substantiate the allocation
195 Harry M. Flower, 61 T.C. No. 18 (Oct. 31, 1973).
196d. See Canelo v. Comm'r, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 53 T.C. 217
(1969); Joseph C. Patchen, 27 T.C. 592 (1956).
197 Burnett v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Levy v. Comm'r,
212 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1954); Universal Oil Products v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451(7th Cir. 1950).
198 Rev. Rul. 249, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 55.
The cost of tires and tubes purchased on new commercial trucking equipment
and used in motor freight transportation is deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expense in full in the taxable year of purchase and payment (or
accrual) if in such use they are consumable within that year or their average
useful life is less than one year even though it extends in part into the next year.
'99 Rev. Rul. 73-357, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 36, at 6.
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of a portion of the total purchase price to the tires and tubes; that
portion of the purchase price would be deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense under Section 162 in the year of purchase.2 °0
5.15 Unreasonable Salary. Section 162 provides for a deduction of
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid during the taxable year
including "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation
for personal services actually rendered." The Regulations provide that
the compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable under the
circumstances; 201 whether or not the compensation is reasonable is
a question of fact.202
In Langley Park Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner,203 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision limiting the amount of compensation
payable to the president and vice-president of a corporation who had few
duties to perform as a management firm ran the business. The court in
Perlmutter v. Commissioner,2 4 upheld the Commissioner's determination
that the salary paid to the president and sole stockholder was unreasonable
and thus not an allowable business expense for the corporation. The
taxpayer argued that the payments were proper as compensation for past
services. The court found no evidence in the record to support this
allegation, but presumably would have given consideration to such an
argument if properly substantiated.20 5
A late 1972 decision, Dave Fischbein Manufacturing Co.,2" 6
determined that the salary paid to the 80-year-old chairman of the board
and former president was reasonable even though he had suffered a
stroke and was in a rest home. The court appeared to rely heavily upon
Mr. Fischbein's long and dedicated service to the corporation and that his
salary of $20,800 had remained constant since 1953. On March 12, 1973,
the Commissioner acquiesced in the Fischbein decision.
On April 30, 1973, the Commissioner also acquiesced in the Tax
Court's decision in R. J. Nicoll Co., 207 decided in October, 1972. In
Nicoll the court determined that the compensation of $11,500 for nine
months of 1965, $15,000 for 1966 and $11,500 for 1967 could not be
20 0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162. "(2) There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business."
201 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b) (3).
202 Perlmutter v. Conm'r, 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
203 Langley Park Apts., Inc. v. Comm'r, 359 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1966), aff'g, 44 T.C.
474 (1965).
2D4 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
205 See Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930).
206 Dave Fishbein Mfg. Co., 59 T.C. No. 33 (Nov. 27, 1972), acquiesced in, 1973
INT. REV. BULL. No. 11, at 5.
207R. J. Nicoll Co., 59 T.C. No. 3 (Oct. 5, 1972), acquiesced in, 1973 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 11, at 5.
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supported as being reasonable based on the testimony submitted by the
taxpayer's witnesses and the limited amount of work performed by
Mr. Nicoll for the corporation during the years in question. However,
when the reasonableness of compensation is in issue the court may look
not only to the current years but also to previous years. 20 8 During earlier
years Mr. Nicoll worked for the predecessor's corporation of R. J. Nicoll
Co. for a salary ranging from $9,000 to $12,000 when the reasonable
worth of the services was $15,000 to $18,000. Undercompensation was
due to efforts to maintain liquid assets within the corporation so as to
permit growth. Furthermore, during the growth years Mr. Nicoll worked
from dawn to dark six or seven days a week. The salaries were held to be
reasonable in 1965 and 1967, and the 1966 reasonable salary was held
to be $11,500 instead of the $15,000 actually paid.
While the cases present taxpayers with persuasive arguments for
use in unreasonable compensation cases when the fact situation applies,
it should be remembered that here salary levels were relatively low
both for the current and prior years.
5.16 Farms-Prepaid Feed. Over the years Congress has been kind
to farmers and as a result they have been afforded certain tax benefits
such as expensing costs which would otherwise be capitalized 209 and being
permitted to prepare tax returns on a cash basis while maintaining records
on the accrual basis. 210 A problem arises when an attempt is made to
determine who is a farmer and what is actually a farm. Treasury
Regulation 1.64-4(a) defines a farm as follows:
[T]he term "farm" embraces the farm in the ordinarily accepted
sense, and includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and truck farms; also
plantations, ranches, and all land used for farming operations. All
individuals, partnerships, or corporations that cultivate, operate, or
manage farms for gain or profit, either as owners or tenants,' are
designated as farmers.... 2 1 1
208 Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930); John C. Nordt Co., 46 T.C.
431 (1966), acquiesced as to this issue, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 2; General Smelting Co.
4 T.C. 313 (1944).
209 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a).
A farmer who operates a farm for profit is entitled to deduct from gross income
as necessary expenses all amounts actually expended in the carrying on of the
business of farming. The cost of ordinary tools of short life or small cost, such
as hand tools, including shovels, rakes, etc., may be deducted. The purchase of
feed and other costs connected with raising livestock may be treated as expense
deductions insofar as such costs represent actual outlay....
210 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(a).
A farmer may make his return upon an inventory method instead of the cash
receipts and disbursements method. It is optional with the taxpayer which of
these methods of accounting is used but, having elected one method, the option
so exercised will be binding upon the taxpayer for the year for which the
option is exercised and for subsequent years unless another method is authorized
by the Commissioner as provided in paragraph (e) of § 1.446-1.
211 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(d).
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In Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc.,212 the taxpayer successfully contended
he was a farmer. The taxpayer operated a feedlot where both its
own cattle and cattle of other owners were fed for four to five months
prior to sale. By the end of 1968, 22,709 head of cattle, 5821 of which
were owned by taxpayer, were being fed. The taxpayer believed it was
required to maintain corporate records on the accrual basis of accounting
to comply with Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.
However, the federal tax returns, relying on Treasury Regulation
1.471-6(a), were filed on cash basis. Because of the election the taxpayer
was able to expense the cost of feed on hand at the end of each taxable
year (which otherwise would have been considered inventory and not
expensed until consumed).
In upholding the taxpayer's methods the Tax Court looked to
W. P. Garth,213 United States v. ChenelI2 4 and W. Cleve Stokes,
215
holding that a poultry hatchery business and a nursery were farms.
Consistent with this the IRS considers feed lots farms for the purpose of
F.D.C.A.216 and Section 6420 relating to payments for gasoline used on
farms. This case has been appealed by the government to the Tenth Circuit.
The Treasury announced it planned to issue Revenue Ruling 73-530
dealing with the deduction of prepaid feed costs by cash-basis farmers.
The proposed Ruling sets forth the following threefold test that expendi-
tures must meet as a condition precedent to obtaining a deduction:
"Expenditure must be a payment and not a deposit; the prepayment must
be made for business purposes, and not merely tax avoidance and; deduc-
tion must not result in material distortion of income. ' ' 217 Publication will
be delayed as an injunction is pending in the District Court for Western
District of Oklahoma. However, in the interim the IRS will continue its
interpretation of the law as set forth in TIR 1266.218 The Revenue Ruling
73-530 was to strictly limit the popular -rollover tax shelter -whereby cattle
feeders prepay extensive amounts for feed to be consumed in a future
period, and acquire an immediate tax deduction in the year of payment.
The Treasury will disallow the expenditure if it is determined to be
a deposit. A deposit is evidenced by the absence of specific guaranties
and a right to a refund for the unused portion. Two illustrations provided
of valid business reasons for the prepayment are to assure a source of
supply or to set a maximum price. If the taxpayer successfully completes
212 Hi-Plains Enterprises, Inc., 60 T.C. No. 19 (April 30, 1973).
213W. P. Garth, 56 T.C. 610 (1971).
214 United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957).
215W. Cleve Stokes, 22 T.C. 415 (1954).
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(g).
217 T.I.R. 1261, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAXEs 55,628.
218 T.I.R. 1266, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAXEs 55,691.
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the first two requirements he still must satisfy the Commissioner that he
has not distorted income as defined in Sections 461 (a) and 446(b).
The Treasury appears to have had Hi-Plains Enterprises in mind
when drafting the proposed ruling as reference is specifically made to
his own livestock in setting forth the requirements for the deduction. It is
submitted that the reference to the taxpayer's "own livestock" is intended
to preclude a deduction for prepaid feed for cattle belonging to others
which he is in the business of feeding.
The issue of prepaid feed expenses of a cash-basis hog farmer was
appealed to the Eighth Circuit in Mann v. Commissioner.219 The Tax
Court denied a deduction because the supplier could not physically supply
all the feed purchased, price reductions would inure to the benefit of the
farmer and the farmer could substitute other types of feed, and
the payment was not an ordinary and necessary business expense. On
appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding the payment was pursuant to
a valid binding contract which guaranteed maximum prices, not merely a
refundable deposit, and also guaranteed a supply at a time when the crop
conditions for the next year were unknown. As a result the expenditures
were an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Because of these factors the Securities and Exchange Commission
now requires that any prospectus for an offering of a livestock feeding
tax shelter program must state the position of the IRS on the deductibility
of prepaid feed costs. The prospectus must also note that such a
position would substantially reduce any intended tax deferral benefit
of such an investment.
5.17 Intangible Drilling Costs. Section 1263(c) and Treasury Regu-
lation 1.612-4 provide for the election to immediately expense the
intangible drilling and development costs incurred by one who holds a
working or operating interest in oil or gas properties. "This option applies
to all expenditures made by an operator for wages, fuel, repair, hauling,
supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and
preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas."'20
Under the typical arrangement the taxpayer-investor enters into a
contract with an oil producer or operator to drill an individual well or
to develop a certain oil or gas lease. The contract specifies the amount of
the intangible drilling cost. If the driller strikes oil or gas the investor
pays additional costs to complete, equip and prepare the well for
production proportionate to the fractional working interest.
The taxpayer deducts the intangible drilling cost on his current
federal tax return and considers the completion costs as his basis in
219 Mann v. Comm'r, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 843
(1972).
220 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4(a).
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his working interest. If the operator has the unconditional right to
negotiate with a drilling contractor and he enters into a contract with
a drilling company, which he controls, for a price in excess of the price
which would have been arrived at in an arm's length transaction, then
Revenue Ruling 73-211221 treats the excess as an investment in the
working interest and disallows any deduction of the excess.
5.18 Medical Deductions. Prior to 1973, the IRS took the position
that birth control pills were not deductible as a medical expense unless
childbirth was a threat to the woman's life.
222 Revenue Ruling 73-200,223
which supersedes Revenue Ruling 67-339, provides that the IRS will
recognize the cost of birth control pills prescribed by a physician as
a medical expense deduction under Section 213(e). Although the
deductibility of other birth control methods and devices is not discussed
by Revenue Ruling 73-200, it is the author's opinion that these items
should also be deductible.
Another development relative to the problem of birth control was
covered by Revenue Ruling 73-201224 which authorizes a medical expense
deduction for abortions and vasectomies. The requirement of the Treasury
Regulation, 225 that the operation be legal under state law, is carried
forward into the Revenue Ruling. The reasoning behind allowing these
medical deductions is that both operations are deemed to be for the
purpose of affecting a structure or function of the 
body.226
The Code 227 authorizes a deduction for insurance premiums
applicable to medical expenses for the taxpayer's family if the premium is
separately stated. Revenue Ruling 73-4832
8 states that even though the
premium for the medical payments portion of automobile insurance is
separately stated, no deduction is allowed since the medical payments
premium covers all occupants of the automobile. To be deductible, the
premiums would have to separately state the portion of the medical
insurance premiums applicable to the taxpayer, his spouse and dependents.
In Revenue Ruling 72-593,2 a late 1972 ruling, the Treasury
recognized that acupuncture treatments rendered in connection with the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease qualify
for the medical expense deduction.
221 Rev. Rul. 73-211, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 19, at 5.
222 Rev. Rul. 339, 1967-2, CuM. BULL. 126.
223 Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 24.
224 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 24.
225 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (ii).
226 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (ii).
227 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 213(e) (1) (c) and 213(e) (2).
228 Rev. Rul. 73-483, 1973 INr. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 9,
229 Rev. Rul, 593, 1972-2, CuM. BULL. 180,
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Revenue Ruling 73-189 230 authorizes the donor or a prospective
donor of a kidney to deduct all hospital, surgical, laboratory, and
transportation expenses relating to the transplant operation. These
expenses are deductible as medical expenses 23' even if tests indicate
the prospective donor is not acceptable.
The Treasury has previously ruled that transportation expenses
incurred by a taxpayer to attend Alcoholics Anonymous Club meetings 232
and the cost of maintaining a dependent in a therapeutic center for
drug addicts233 qualify as medical deductions. Revenue Ruling 73-327234
permits a deduction for treatment expenses, including meals and lodging,
incurred by a taxpayer while living for several months at a therapeutic
center for alcoholics.
The Treasury has proposed an amendment to the Regulation 235
which authorizes a medical expense deduction for a capital expenditure
to the extent the expenditure exceeds the increase in the value of
the property. The proposed amendment provides that maintenance and
operating expenses incurred in connection with the capital expenditure are
currently deductible provided the medical reason for the expenditure
continues to exist.
5.19 Interest-Tax-Exempt Securities. No deduction is permitted
for interest paid on indebtedness incurred in purchasing securities if the
income resulting from these obligations is wholly tax exempt. 36 Where
the indebtedness is traceable to the purchase of tax-exempt securities by a
dealer in such securities, or where a brokerage business deals in both
exempt and non-exempt securities and the use of the borrowed funds can-
not be directly traced (so that an inference arises that the borrowed funds
were used for all facets of the business) the deduction will be denied. 237
This rationale was applied and extended in James C. Bradford.238 The
petitioner had borrowed funds daily to conduct its brokerage business, a
facet of which involved the purchase of tax-exempt securities. To
determine deductibility the Tax Court expressly adopted the Commissioner
230 Rev. Rul. 73-189, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 9.
= INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (e) (1) (B).
232 Rev. Rul. 273, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 112.
233 Rev. Rul. 226, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 96.
234 Rev. Rul. 73-327, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 32, at 7.
235 Proposed Treas. Reg., § 1.213-1 (e) (iii), 38 Fed. Reg. 26918 (1973).
236 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 265.237 Wynn v. U.S., 288 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).238James C, Bradford, 60 TC, No, 30 (May 22, 1973),
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v. Leslie23 9 "purpose test": "[W]e have concluded that the approach of the
Second Circuit ... which permits the proscribed purpose to be inferred
from a continuous course of conduct involving borrowing and the
acquisition of tax exempt securities, represents the better view."
240
The logic for the "purpose test" employs simple deduction: if the
taxpayer had not held tax-exempt securities its monthly average assets
would be decreased proportionately; the taxpayer would incur decreased
indebtedness and therefore a decreased interest expense.
241 Since this
decrease in interest expense equates with the expense incurred to
purchase exempt securities, an amount equal to the decrease is
nondeductible interest expense. The lesson is quite explicit-a proscribed
purpose of borrowing to purchase tax-exempt securities will be inferred
from a continued course of dealing that involves borrowing and
acquisition of such securities.
6.00 Depreciation
6.01 Tax Shelters. The use of depreciation on real property to
create a tax shelter is an accepted instrument of efficient tax planning.
The trick has always been to achieve the greatest depreciation write-off
with the least amount of capital outlay and personal liability. It has long
been held that a party who purchases property subject to a mortgage
acquires a depreciable interest in the total value of the property even
though his actual cash outlay is minimal.
242 Assuming an individual can
obtain the requisite financing, the creation of the write-off poses few
problems. However, creation of the write-off without incurring personal
liability on the obligation is more difficult to achieve. The limited
partnership provides a vehicle to limit personal liability, but even so, the
general partner is liable and a partnership is not well suited to individual
use.
213 Subchapter S election would allow the pass-through of losses
(depreciation deduction) and afford limited liability to the shareholders,
but if real estate rentals are the only activity engaged in by the





239 Commissioner v. Leslie, 413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007(1970).
240 James C. Bradford, 60 T.C. No. 30 (May 22, 1973). Accord, Indian Trail Trading
Post, 60 T.C. No. 54 (June 27, 1973). Here, petitioner borrowed funds in excess of
his current needs and eight months later, purchased tax exempt bonds, while 
still
having cash in excess of needs. The interest deduction was disallowed with 
the
"purpose test" prevailing.
241 413 F.2d at 639.
242 Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir.
1950); Manual D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
243 Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters; The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27
TAX L. REv. 525 (1972).
244 INT. REV, COPE OF 1954, § 1372 (e) (5),
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Through a series of transactions the taxpayer in David F. Bolger 245
was able to achieve both limited liability and individual write-off of thedepreciable interest in his investments. The taxpayer followed the same
method in ten separate transactions challenged by the Commissioner:(I) Form a financing corporation of the eventual titleholders of theproperty with minimal capitalization; (2) Arrange to purchase a buildingthat some commercial or industrial concern desired to lease; (3) Usually
on the same day (a) convey the property to the financing corporation,(b) the financing corporation would enter a lease with the user, and(c) sell its own corporate notes equal to the purchase price to aninstitutional lender, the notes being secured by a first mortgage and an
assignment of the lease; (4) The corporation would then convey theproperty to its shareholders for "one dollar and other valuable considera-tion" subject to the mortgage and the lease, but without a cash payment;(5) The transferees would execute an assumption agreement, assuming
all of the financing corporation's obligations on the lease and the
mortgage but limiting their personal liability.
At the conclusion of these transactions the shareholders of thefinancing corporation held legal title to the property. This interest wasdepreciable in the amount of the mortgage on the buildings. The lessee, bythe lease and mortgage agreements, was primarily liable for the mortgagepayments. The financing corporation retained secondary liability on the
mortgages, but the shareholders of the financing corporation were not
obligated beyond the requirement that the financing corporation be keptin existence. The shareholders reported their proportionate share of theincome and the deductions attributable to the properties.
In answering the question whether the taxpayer was entitled to thedepreciation deductions three issues are raised: (1) Whether the financing
corporations constituted separate viable entities; (2) Whether if theyare, are they or the taxpayer entitled to the depreciation deduction;(3) What is the basis of the property?
The Court found three legitimate business purposes for the creation
of the corporations: to maximize financing by avoiding state lawrestrictions on loans to individuals, to provide a mechanism for limitingpersonal liability, and to facilitate multiple-lender financing. After thetransfers of property, the corporations remained liable on their obligationsto the lenders and were required to remain in existence. In fact, one of the
corporations did participate in refinancing arrangements after the transferto the shareholders. These facts were held sufficient to find the
existence of a separate corporate entity under the test set forth inMoline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business
245 David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. No, 75 (March 8, 1973),
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life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law
of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with thedemands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed
convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.24
The Commissioner contended that at the time of the transfer the
corporation did not hold a depreciable present interest in the properties.
Further, because the lease payments were entirely committed to the
mortgage obligations, the corporations could only transfer a reversionary
interest in the properties. The court concluded that the taxpayer did
receive full legal title and beneficial ownership of the property from the
corporation. Since the interest held by the corporations in the properties
was depreciable, the interest held by the corporation's transferees was
also held depreciable. 247
That a taxpayer's basis in depreciable property includes the amount
of any encumbrance on the land even though the taxpayer is not
personally liable for the encumbrance was firmly established in Crane
v. Commissioner and subsequent cases. The Crane doctrine permits the
taxpayer to recover his investment in the property before he has actually
made any cash investment on the assumption that a capital investment
will eventually be made. The taxpayer in David F. Bolger was found to
have a definite interest in the property as his equity increases as the mort-
gage is paid and he gains from any appreciation in the value of the land.
The dissenting opinions in David F. Bolger raised some valid
considerations for anyone attempting a similar venture. First, the step
transaction doctrine should have been applied. 248 A connected series of
transactions must be construed as a single transaction and the internal
revenue laws applied to the series as a whole and not its individual parts.
There was no legitimate business purpose to the transactions other than
to achieve a tax result.249 Second, the real equity in the financing
corporations was evidenced by the fractional interests transferred by deed
to the shareholders. Since the corporations were stripped of their only
asset, the share certificates represented nothing. Third, the income from
the rentals should have been taxed to the financing corporations or as
income to an entity taxable as a corporation. The assumption agreement
bound the transferees together and required them to perform certain
business functions, i.e., maintain the corporations and oversee the
246 Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436, 438 (1943).
247 Ethel S. Amey, 22 T.C. 756, 762 (1954). See also Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1(1947); Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954).
248 George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203, 211 (1968).
249 David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. No. 75 (March 8, 1973). See also Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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corporate activities. As such they possess the major characteristics of an
entity taxable as a corporation under Treasury Regulation 301.7701-2.
If the association more nearly resembles a corporation than separate
individuals the interest of the taxpayer would be that of a shareholder
and taxable as a dividend not income. The corporation would be the
only entity with a depreciable interest in the property.
Judge Goffe, dissenting, expressed the actual result achieved by
Mr. Bolger:
I conclude that the transfer of title was for the sole purpose of
passing on to the individuals a deduction for accelerated depreciation
in excess of the income from the property. Furthermore, I do not
see how the reporting of income by the individuals adds any strength
to petitioners' case. In my view both the income and the deductions
belong to the corporation.
I conclude that the transfer of title was nothing more than
a device to secure for the petitioners the benefits of Subchapter S
status which they could not otherwise enjoy.250
The Commissioner has indicated the case will be appealed to the
Third Circuit. The finding that the financing corporation was a viable
corporate entity has been cited in three other Tax Court decisions as to
what constitutes such an entity or whether such an entity existed.
25
' David
L. Bolger was also cited favorably for its finding that the amount of an
outstanding mortgage is includable in the basis of depreciable property.
252
If the Third Circuit rules against the Tax Court's decision the most likely
finding would be that the association of shareholders, as transferees of
the property, is a taxable entity. If a second taxable entity is held to exist
the income would be taxable to the entity and more importantly the entity
would have the only depreciable interest in the property. Acquisition of a
deductible tax loss through the use of accelerated depreciation in excess of
rental income was the purpose behind the entire transaction. The creation
of a second taxable entity would strip the transaction of its tax advantages.
6.02 Depreciation Method-Federal Power Commission. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether under the Tax
Reform Act of 19692 3 the Federal Power Commission
25 4 retained the
=5o David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. No. 75 (March 8, 1973).
251 Clayton E. Greenfield, 60 T.C. No. 46 (June 13, 1973); G. & J. Invest. Corp., 42
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1052 (1973); Charles Schneider & Co., Inc., 42 P-H TAx CT.
MEM. 553 (1973).
252 George W. Wiebusch, 59 T.C. No. 76 (March 8, 1973).
253 Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 441, 26 U.S.C. § 167(1) (1969).
254Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(d)(1954). The Natural Gas Act gave the
Federal Power Commission the authority to permit or require a utility to change its
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authority to permit a regulated utility to change its depreciation method
from an accelerated method to a slower method of depreciation.255 The
Court held the purpose of the Act was to forestall switches to faster
methods of depreciation, to guard against rate increases and to enhance
the competitive position of some utilities. The "freeze" imposed on the
method of depreciation was not absolute and did not prevent the adoption
of a slower method of depreciation where requested by a utility.
While the Court found that the Commission did have the power, the
exercise of such power was subject to the requirements of the consumer.
A change in the depreciation method that resulted in higher rates would
be allowable only if the increase was "just and reasonable." Further, that
rates are "just and reasonable" only if consumer interests are protected
and if financial health of the pipeline remains strong.256
6.03 Public Utility--Construction Equipment. Revenue Ruling
59-3802 7 provides:
Depreciation sustained on construction equipment owned by a
taxpayer and used in the erection of capital improvements for its
own use is not an allowable deduction, but shall be added to and
made a part of the cost of the capital improvements. So much
thereof as is applicable to the cost of depreciable capital improve-
ments is recoverable through deductions for depreciation over the
useful life of such capital improvements.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine whether the
Ninth Circuit was correct in deciding that Revenue Ruling 59-380 is an
improper and incorrect interpretation of the law. 258 The taxpayer is a
utility owning considerable amounts of construction equipment which it
uses in the construction of capital assets for its own facilities. In 1962 and
1963 the taxpayer deducted the depreciation on its equipment based on the
life of the equipment (ten years) instead of the life of the capital asset
(thirty years). The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and contended
that Revenue Ruling 59-380 and Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United
States2 59 were controlling.
Section 167260 allows a depreciation deduction on property used in a
trade or business. If the taxpayer owning construction equipment is not in
255 FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 93 S. Ct. 1723 (1973), rev'g, 462 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25 Id. at 1732.
257 Rev. Rul. 59-380, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 87.
258 Idaho Power Co. v. Comm'r, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94
S. Ct. 351 (1973).
259 Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
260 Irr. REV. CoaE oF 1954, § 167(a). There shall be allowed as a depreciation
deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a
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the construction business such equipment is not "property used in the
trade or business" of the taxpayer and, therefore, under Revenue Ruling
59-380 is not depreciable property. The construction equipment constitutes
a cost of construction and under Treasury Regulation Section 1.263(a)-2
(2)261 is a capital expenditure to be added to the basis of the asset
constructed. The Court of Claims approved this application of Section
167 in Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States.262 Southern Gas
attempted to individually deduct a portion of depreciation on automotive
equipment used in the construction of the corporation's new facilities.
Southern Gas capitalized that portion of depreciation on the equipment
used in the construction project and also claimed full depreciation of the
equipment on its tax returns for the years in question. In disallowing this
procedure the court held that all costs that give an asset value should
be included in its depreciable basis.263 Even though it may be a goal of
a taxpayer to expand its facilities, such expansion is not "the" business
of the taxpayer to which Section 167 applies.
The taxpayer in Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner contended that
depreciation is not a capital expenditure and that Idaho Power was
engaged in the "business" of constructing new facilities. Section 263 264
specifies those amounts paid out for new buildings or for permanent im-
provements are capital expenditures. Depreciation is a "decrease in value"
not a payment, expenditure, or out-of-pocket expense, 265 and no exception
is made under Section 167 because it relates to a capital expenditure.
Contrary to Southern Gas, there is no double recovery in Idaho
Power because the depreciation deduction was not included in capitaliza-
tion of the asset. Nor is there any danger, as the Court of Claims felt
existed 266 that all costs of construction could be expensed if the taxpayer
was allowed a separate deduction for the depreciation cost of construction
equipment. All items actually paid out for the construction are part of
the capital asset and includable in the asset's basis.
A revenue ruling does not have the force of law and to the extent
it conflicts with a statute it is ineffective. The taxpayer's interpretation of
Sections 263 and 167 is well founded. There does not appear to be any
foundation for Revenue Ruling 59-340 and its inclusion of depreciation
261Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)(2)-e]xamples of capital expenditures: (a) The cost of
acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings....
262 412 F.2d 1222,1264 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
263 Id. at 1265.
264 ITr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263. Capital Expenditures. "(a) No deduction shall be
allowed for-(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improve-
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."
265 Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1959); Orr v. United States,
343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965); Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 T.C. 953 (1964); Maurice
S. Gordon, 37 T.C. 986 (1962).
266 Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1265 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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on construction equipment in the capitalization of an asset. While the
useful life of the asset constructed may be thirty years, obviously, the life
of the construction equipment is much less. If the taxpayer is to remain in
business the equipment will have to be replaced several times before the
capital expenditure in the original equipment is recovered. Capitalizing
the equipment over the life of the asset constructed would defeat the
purpose of depreciation.
6.04 Component Depreciation-Used Buildings. The IRS has
changed its position on the use of component depreciation of used
buildings. Under Revenue Ruling 66-111287 component depreciation of
new buildings was permissible but component depreciation of used
buildings was prohibited. The ruling was based on the Tax Court holding
in Louis Lesser 268 that as to a used building the useful life of a component
part was "not susceptible of any precise mathematical solution." 269 The
ruling agreed with the Lesser decision on the determination of component
life and asserted that component parts of a used building "are not
ordinarily subject to fair market value determinations for allocations
of basis or for depreciation purposes.
270
The IRS did not raise the Lesser case or Revenue Ruling 66-111 in
a 1970 case that approved the component method of depreciation on a
used building, Harsh Investment Corp. v. United States.2n Harsh retained
a reputable firm of appraisers to allocate the purchase price between the
land and the building purchased and to appraise the value and life of
the component parts of the building. Nine accounts were established:
ceilings, internal construction, roof cover, lighting and wiring, plumbing,
heating, ventilating, fire protection and elevators. The government did not
seriously contest the method employed.
Revenue Ruling 73-410272 sets forth the IRS's new position on
component depreciation. Although Harsh is not cited in the ruling, the
method of component depreciation of used buildings expressed in Harsh is
basically the position taken by the IRS. The ruling makes one stipulation
that if the taxpayer elects to apply Section 1.167(a)- 1 M of the regulations
(ADR provisions) and determines the depreciation for the building under
that section, component depreciation may not be utilized.
267 Rev. Rul. 111, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 46.
268 Louis Lesser, 42 T.C. 688 (1964), afld, 352 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1965).
269 Id. at 706.
270 Rev. Rul. 111, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 47.
271 Harsh Invest. Corp. v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 409 (D. Ore. 1970).
272 Rev. Rul. 73-410,1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 8.
273Treas. Reg. § 1.167(2)-11. Depreciation based on asset depreciation ranges for
property placed in service after December 31, 1970.
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6.05 Downtown Shopping Mail. Revenue Ruling 73-188274 permit-
ted store owners, who were assessed for the construction of a downtown
shopping mall, to depreciate the amount of the assessment as a capital
expenditure. To enhance the downtown business district, the city enclosed
the main street into a mall, issued bonds, and assessed the adjacent
property owners for the value of the bonds. Section 164 disallows the
deduction, as an expense, of taxes assessed against local property owners
for benefits tending to increase the value of the property assessed.27 5
However, such assessments will be considered a capital expenditure if the
benefit conferred can be considered to give the business an advantage over
competitors. In this case the advantage was expected to continue over a
ten-year period, therefore, the "capital expenditure" was depreciable over
a ten-year period. The cost of maintaining the mall and that portion of
the assessment that is interest expense on the bonds are deductible as
business expenses.n 6
7.00 Corporations
7.01 Disallowance of Post-Acquisition Losses. Section 269 provides
for the disallowance of deductions and losses if the principal purpose of
the acquisition was to evade or avoid federal income taxes. The section
was enacted in 1943 to prevent the purchasing of loss corporations to
offset high profits which were subject to the "excess profits" tax. The offset
was accomplished through tax loss carryovers and selling acquired assets
with a high tax basis and a low market value.2
Originally the disallowance was thought to apply only to benefits
accruing to the acquiring corporation. 78 Later the Fourth Circuit rejected
this distinction in Commissioner v. Costal Oil Storage Co.Y9 holding the
disallowance applicable to the acquired as well as the acquiring
corporation. In James Realty Co. v. United Statesm. the application of
274 Rev. Rul. 73-188, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 8.
275 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164(c).
(c) Deduction Denied in Case of Certain Taxes.-No deduction shall be
allowed for the following taxes:
(1) Taxes assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the
value of the property assessed; but this paragraph shall not prevent the deduc-
tion of so much of such taxes as is properly allocable to maintenance or
interest charges.
276 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(b) (1).
(b) (1) Insofar as assessments against local benefits are made for the purpose
of maintenance or repair or for the purpose of meeting interest charges with
respect to such benefits, they are deductible. In such cases, the burden is on the
taxpayer to show the allocation of the amounts assessed to the different purposes.
If the allocation cannot be made, none of the amount so paid is deductible.
7 7BrITKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 16.21 (3d ed. 1971).278Alprose Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
9Costal Oil Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
280 James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).
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Section 269 was extended to newly formed corporations which were
attempting to benefit from the corporate multiple sur-tax exemption.
The problem next arose as to whether or not Section 269 applies
to post-acquisition losses and decreases in asset value. The deduction of
post-acquisition losses was disallowed in three of the five circuits that
considered the issue prior to 1973. During 1973281 the Fifth Circuit, in
Hall Paving Co. v. United States, 28 2 joined the majority when they
concurred with the analysis of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
looked to the legislative intent 28 3 of Section 269 and determined the
application of Section 269 was not limited to the disallowance of losses
occurring prior to acquisition.
7.02 Redemption of Preferred Stock. The Supreme Court, in Albers
v. Commissioner,'8 declined to rehear the issue presented by United
States v. Davis28 5 in 1970 involving preferred stock redemptions and
the dividend-equivalence test of Section 302(b) (1).
The A&S Transportation Company found it necessary to obtain a
loan guaranteed by the Federal Maritime Commission to replace a barge.
However, before the Commission would approve the loan, the taxpayers
were required to invest $150,000 additional equity in the corporation. The
investment was made in the form of preferred stock which was later
redeemed by the corporation following repayment of the loan. Although
the taxpayers received a return of the same amount they had originally
invested, the Commissioner treated the redemption as a dividend, thereby
giving rise to ordinary income to each shareholder, when all he received
was a return of capital. The Commissioner argued the shareholders did not
meet the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test of Section 302(b)(1).
The Supreme Court, in Davis, interpreted the section to mean a stock
redemption will always result in dividend treatment when there is no
change in the relative economic interests' of the shareholders.
Justices Powell, Douglas and Black dissented from the majority's
refusal to rehear the issue stating the interpretation was not justified "by
the language of the Code nor by the legislative history, and certainly
not by precedent prior to Davis. ' 286 The dissenters also believed the
281Borge v. Conmm'r, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968); Luke v. Com'r, 351 F.2d 568
(7th Cir. 1965); R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
The deduction was allowed in the following two circuits. Herculite Protective Fabrics
Corp. v. Comm'r, 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968); Zanesville Invest. Co. v. Comm'r, 335
F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1964).
22 Hall Paving Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1973).
283H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), reprinted in, 1944 CuM. BULL.
901,938.
284 Albers v. Comm'r, 94 S. Ct. 279 (1973).
285 United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
286 94 S. Ct. at 281.
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business reason for the investment and the absence of tax evasion or
even avoidance should be taken into consideration.
7.03 Redemptions-Related Corporations. The IRS announced in
Revenue Ruling 73-2287 it will not follow the decision of the Sixth Circuit
in Commissioner v. Stickney,288 which held that Section 351 controlled
when a transaction was covered by both Sections 304 and 351. The
complex problem can be best presented by using the government's
illustration from the Revenue Ruling:
Corporation X and corporation Y have been engaged in business for
many years and have only voting common stock outstanding. A, an
individual, owned all of the outstanding Y stock. The Y stock in the
hands of A was a capital asset, within the meaning of section 1221
of the Code. Of the 50 shares of X common stock that were
outstanding, A owned 30 shares (60 percent of the outstanding
stock) and unrelated individuals owned 20 shares.
Pursuant to a plan, X, for good business reasons, acquired all
of the Y stock owned by A in exchange for sufficient X stock so
that after the transaction A owned approximately 81 percent of the
outstanding X stock. In addition, A received 65x dollars in cash. A
realized a gain of 40x dollars as a result of the transaction. The
remaining 19 percent of X stock was owned by individuals unrelated
to A. At the time of the transaction X had earnings and profits of
80x dollars. 28 9
Section 304 applies when a shareholder sells stock of one corporation
to another related corporation if the shareholder owns at least 50 percent
of the combined voting power (voting shares or value of shares) of each
corporate entity. Section 304 treats the above transaction as a contribution
of the value of Y stock to X's capital followed by a redemption of A's
stock in X corporation, whereby the status of the redemption is
determined by Section 302. The redemption is considered as a dividend
(ordinary income) to the recipient unless it meets one of the three tests
of Section 302(b): (1) not essentially equivalent to a dividend, (2)
substantially disproportionate, or (3) complete termination of the
shareholders' interest.
Since the redemption will not qualify under the safe harbors of
Section 302(b), it will be treated as a dividend. However, A now owns
over 80 percent of the stock of X corporation. Therefore, A qualifies for
protection under Section 351 (a), which provides for nonrecognition of
gain or loss if one or more persons transfer property to a corporation
solely for stock or securities and immediately thereafter own 80 percent
287 Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 13.
288 Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).
289 Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973 Ir. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 13.
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of the combined voting power of all classes of stock and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares.
The government argued in Stickney and in this Revenue Ruling that
Congress intended to require all stock sales between related corporations
to run the gauntlet of Section 302. The effect is to permit shareholders
owning over 80 percent to receive capital gains treatment while
those owning between 50 and 80 percent receive a dividend.
While we can certainly agree that Congress probably intended to
prevent capital gains treatment for shareholders owning over 80 percent,
it is unfortunate they did not more specifically enact this intent. With
the overlap of Sections 304 and 351, it is submitted that the remedy
lies with legislative enactment, not with the Commissioner picking up
the pen and so decreeing.
7.04 Liquidation-Involuntary Conversion. Section 337 provides
for nonrecognition of gain or loss at the corporate level when corporate
assets are sold or exchanged subsequent to the adoption of a plan of
liquidation and all assets are distributed to shareholders within twelve
months following the date of adoption. Section 337 was adopted in 1954
to eliminate the confusion created by Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co.290 and United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co. 291 in
determining whether the assets were sold by the corporation or by the
shareholders subsequent to a liquidation. In Revenue Ruling 56-372 292 the
Treasury refused to treat an involuntary conversion as a sale or exchange,
thereby precluding the application of Section 337. After defeats in Kent
Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner 93 and Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United
States,294 the Treasury changed its policy in Revenue Ruling 64-100.29
As a result an involuntary conversion is now considered a sale or
exchange under Section 337.
If corporate property is destroyed by fire or other casualty loss, when
does the sale occur? The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Morton 98
holds the sale does not occur until the insurance proceeds are received, or
are readily determinable, thereby permitting the corporation to adopt a
plan of liquidation subsequent to the casualty loss and to avoid federal tax
at the corporate level. During 1973 the Sixth Circuit in Central Tablet
Mfg. Co. v. United States297 determined the sale occurs on the date of the
290 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
29 United States v. Cumberland Publ. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
"29 Rev. Rul. 372, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 187.
293 Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Comm'r, 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961).
294 Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. CI. 1960).
"95 Rev. Rul. 100, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 130.
296 United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968).
297 Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Morton 387 F.2d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 1968).
Winter, 1974]
59
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
AKRON LAw REvIEw
fire, thereby precluding the benefits of Section 337 if the plan of
liquidation was not adopted before the fire. The Eighth Circuit in
Morton reasoned that a sale or exchange does not occur when tangible
assets are converted into a chose in action since collection is dependent
upon compliance with conditions of the policy, proof of loss and
investigation by the insurance company. The court held: "[I]t would thus
appear that the sale or exchange by involuntary conversion is not
completed until either the policy proceeds are received, or an enforceable
settlement of a determined amount is agreed upon or a court judgment
obtained. ' 298 The government pointed out that in federal condemnation
cases the date of sale is the date when the proceedings are filed and the
funds deposited. State law varies as to date when title passes in condemna-
tion proceedings. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the condemnation
analogy by pointing out that the title passed and an enforceable right
to a specific award accrued at the date of filing. Furthermore, con-
demnation proceedings are normally preceded by negotiations giving the
taxpayer time to adopt a plan of liquidation.
The Sixth Circuit in Central Tablet Mfg. Co. noted that while
Towanda and Kent had expanded Section 337 to include involuntary
conversions, Congress never evidenced an intent to provide a windfall for
taxpayers experiencing an involuntary conversion prior to the adoption
of a plan of liquidation. Congress has provided for nonrecognition of
insurance proceeds through Section 1033, for taxpayers suffering an
involuntary conversion who choose to rebuild.
During 1973 a district court, in California,2 9 followed the Eighth
Circuit and held the sale or exchange did not occur at the time of the fire.
It is the author's opinion that the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
coupled with the analogy to condemnation proceedings presents the
better view of when a sale or exchange occurs. This is an issue which
will undoubtedly be resolved by the Supreme Court.
7.05 Distribution of Appreciated Assets. A major tax problem was
presented to Peeler Realty Co., Inc.300 when it became necessary, because
of the heavy ad valorem taxes annually assessed, to divest itself of
extensive holdings of appreciated forest lands. The land had a tax basis
of approximately $40,000 and a fair market value of $2,500,000. The
problem was complicated by the fact that the founder of the corporation
had designated the family corporation as the principal beneficiary of
his estate and the founder had become mentally incompetent to change his
298 387 F.2d at 448.
299 Kinney v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-528 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
300 Peeler Realty Co., Inc., 60 T.C. No. 74 (August 14, 1973).
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will. The founder's condition precluded liquidation and dissolution of
the corporation, a method approved of by the Treasury.
301
The corporation had been approached by several paper mills in
the past but had rejected all the offers. A sale of the land by the
corporation and subsequent distribution to the shareholders would result
in a double taxation. The corporation would be taxed at capital gains
rates on the sale of the land and the stockholders would be charged
with receiving an ordinary dividend.
The shareholders of the corporation approved a distribution of the
lands to the shareholders as an ordinary dividend. After the distribution
the shareholders authorized an agent to negotiate a sale of the lands. Bids
were taken and the land was eventually purchased by one of the paper
mills that had originally been approached by Peeler Realty. The
corporation did not report the sale on the corporate income tax returns.
Each stockholder reported his pro rata share as capital gains.302 The
corporation had no earnings or profits from which to pay a dividend
so that any distribution in excess of basis would be taxed as a return of
capital at capital gains' rates.3 0a The Commissioner contended that the
sale should be imputed to the corporation and proceeds taxed as an
ordinary dividend to the shareholders.
Corporate distributions of appreciated property under the circum-
stances set forth are not taxable to the corporation unless the sale can be
imputed to the corporation or the transaction can be viewed as an
anticipatory assignment of income. Under the first exception, the sale
is imputed to the corporation on the theory that it is the corporation
which in substance, though not in form, sells the property.3 4 An imputed
sale generally arises where the corporation has negotiated the sale of
a corporate asset with a buyer. The corporation then either liquidates
or distributes the assets as a dividend, whereupon the shareholders
complete the sale with the buyer.
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from
a sale of property are not finally to be determined solely by the
means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction is to
be viewed as a whole... A sale by one person cannot be transformed
301 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331-337.
302 Hines v. United States, 477 F.2d 1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1973). Hines was one of
the stockholders of Peeler Realty Co., Inc. The Hines case was appealed to the Fifth
Circuit where decision was for the taxpayer. The facts and the outcome of both
cases, Peeler & Hines, are identical and are based on the same legal precepts. The
cases will be considered together and cited interchangeably as comment requires.
303 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (c), 316(a).
304 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); United States v.
Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); A.B.C.D.
Lands, Inc., 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
Winter, 1974]
61
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
AKRON LAW REVIEW
for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a
conduit through which to pass title.30 5
However, where the corporation never planned to make the sale itself,
liquidated its holdings and its shareholders subsequently sold the assets
to a party originally approached by the corporation, the sale was not
imputed to the corporation.306
Section 337 eliminated the imputed sale problem for the liquidating
corporation. If the corporation distributes all of its assets and liquidates
within one year of the adoption of the plan no gain or loss will be
recognized to the corporation on a subsequent sale of the assets by the
shareholders. The problem still exists for those corporations that do not
in fact liquidated under Section 337. In A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc.30 7 an in-kind
distribution of grain acquired by the corporation as rental on its holdings
of farm land, subsequently sold by the distributees, was imputed to
the corporation. Normally, no gain or loss would be recognized on the
distribution of corporate property under Section 311, but in A.B.C.D.
Lands, Inc. the corporation actively participated in the negotiation and
sale of the grain. And in fact, the shareholders could not have resold the
grain but for their relationship with the corporation.308 This was a
primary reason why the sale was imputed to the corporation.
The lack of corporate involvement in the sale of the forest lands in
Hines v. United States was a determinate factor in the court's decision.
We hold that the sine qua non of the imputed income rule is a
finding that the corporation actively participated in the transaction
that produced the income to be imputed. Only if the corporation
in fact participated in the sale transaction; by negotiation, prior
agreement, post-distribution activities, or participated in any other
significant manner, could the corporation be charged with earning
the income sought to be taxed.
309
This decision is supported by dicta in a First Circuit decision that the
sale will be imputed to a non-liquidating corporation unless "the sale was
the result of independent and active negotiations by its stockholders .... "1310
The imputed income theory focuses on the role of the corporation in
the creation of the income. The doctrine of anticipatory assignment
of income, however, is primarily concerned with the type of assets that is
distributed to the shareholders. The owner of rights to income or potential
income cannot avoid having such income recognized by transferring the
305 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
306 United States v. Cumberland Publ. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1949).
307 A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc., 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
308 Id. at 849, 850.
309 Hines v. United States, 477 F.2d 1063, 1069 (5th Cir. 1973).
310 Waltham Netoco Theatres, Inc. v. Comm'r, 401 F.2d 333, 335 (Ist Cir. 1968).
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rights prior to the time *at which they must be recognized."1' The
Commissioner asserted that distribution of lands by Peeler Realty
constituted such an assignment of income. The doctrine has been held
not to apply to a transfer of appreciated assets, the appreciated value
of which can only be realized by a sale. In Cambell v. Prothro 312 the
taxpayer made a gift of 100 head of calves to a charity then negotiated
the sale of the calves with the remainder of his herd. The Commissioner
was unsuccessful in his attempt to apply the doctrine of anticipatory
assignment of income. The court found in reaching a similar result
in Peeler Realty Co., Inc., that:
Cases which have found an anticipatory assignment of income are
clearly distinguishable from the one before us. In those cases, there
was no necessity for a sale, or for any other significant effort by
the transferee.... Here, as noted above, the shareholders had to
effect a sale before the unrealized appreciation in the lands could
become income
13
In the cases where the doctrine has been applied the recipient
of the income has usually been inactive, engaging in no substantial
income-producing activities.
314
After rejecting the application of the doctrine of anticipatory
assignment of income and imputation of sale, the Fifth Circuit limited
its finding somewhat to the particular facts of the case. The court
pointed out that Peeler Realty Co., Inc. had substantially liquidated
its holdings retaining only passive income-producing property in the form
of low-rental housing, and probably would have completely liquidated
had it not been for the unfortunate terms of the corporate founder's
will. The court recognized the loophole in Section 301 that allows deficit
corporations to distribute appreciated property without having the
distribution taxed as a dividend, but concluded:
[W]e do not think it is proper to attempt to plug that loophole by
conjuring up visions of corporate sales where no corporate activities
justify such images ... the aperture exists because distributions of
appreciated property by a deficit corporation are not deemed
distributions in the nature of dividends.
3 15
It does not appear as though the Court will be willing to venture far
from the facts of this case.
311 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
312 Cambell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1954). See also Commissioner
v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948); Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894
(1964); Stuart A. Rogers, 38 T.C. 785 (1962).
313 Peeler Realty Co., Inc., 60 T.C. No. 74 (August 14, 1973).
314Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d
524 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Doyle v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir, 1945).
315477 F.2d at 1071.
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Hines has been cited once since its decision to support a finding that
a sale made by a separate corporate entity should not be imputed to the
related corporation that originally transferred the property to the seller.316
R & T Developers was engaged in land development, one of its
subdivisions contained two lots that would be especially profitable when
sold. B & C Corporation was created as a Subchapter S corporation to
negotiate the sale of the two lots, title remaining in R & T Developers.
B & C Corporation applied for and received in its own name a needed
zoning variance and negotiated the sale of the lots to two oil companies.
After negotiations were completed R & T Developers deeded the land to
B & C Corporation at cost, $6,500, the lots having a fair market value
of $35,000 each. B & C Corporation reported the sales on its own tax
return. The Commissioner asserted the sale of the property should be
imputed to R & T Developers. The Tax Court found on the facts that
the transactions more nearly resembled those found in the United States
v. Cumberland Public Service Co. than those of Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co. and held that the actions of B & C Corporation were
sufficiently independent of control by R & T Developers to be regarded
as a separate transaction.
7.06 Incorporation of Cash-Basis Taxpayer. Cash-basis taxpayers,
who intended to incorporate their businesses, won a substantial victory
when the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's interpretation of
Section 357(c) in John P. Bongiovanni. 17 The Second Circuit held:
[T]he word "liability" is used in Section 357(c) in the same sense
as the word "liability" referred to in the legislative history of
Section 357(c). It was not meant to be synonymous with the strictly
accounting liabilities involved in the case at bar. Section 357(c) was
meant to apply to what might be called "tax" liabilities, i.e., liens in
excess of tax costs, particularly mortgages encumbering property
transferred in a Section 351 transaction.3 18
In a decision to which five judges dissented, including Judge
Quealy who wrote the Tax Court opinion in Bongiovanni, the Tax
Court in Wilford E. Thatcher 19 found the Second Circuit's interpretation
of Section 357(c) to be too narrow and refused to follow the Second
Circuit's decision.
Section 351 (a) provides that where property is transferred to a
corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities of such corporation
316 R. & T. Developers, Inc., 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 533, 535 (1973).
317John P. Bongiovanni, 40 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 1182 (1971), rev'd, Bongiovanni v.
Comm'r, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972). See Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 354
F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Where under quite similar circumstances the entire
problem is treated without discussion of Section 357.
318 Bongiovanni v. Comm'r, 470 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1972).
19 Wilford F, Thatvher, 61 T.C, No, 4 (Oct. 4. 1973).
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and immediately thereafter the transferor is in control of the corporation,
no gain or loss shall be recognized in the exchange. However, Section
357(c) (1) provides that in a Section 351 exchange:
[I]f the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the
amount of the liabilities to which the property is subject, exceeds
the total of the adjusted basis of the property transferred pursuant
to such exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of property which
is not a capital asset, as the case may be. 320 (Emphasis added)
To the cash-basis taxpayer the adjusted bases of accounts receivable is
zero because he has not reported them as income even though the market
value of the receivables might be a considerable proportion of the
taxpayer's assets. All liabilities, including accounts payable, transferred
to the corporation are transferred at their book value, even though the
taxpayer would not be allowed a deduction for the payables until he had
actually paid them.321 The Tax Court applies unequal treatment to the
two categories even though the accounts payable, in most instances, will
correspond to the outstanding accounts receivable.
For purposes of determining gain on the transfers the Commissioner
includes all liabilities, including trade accounts payable, and affixes
an adjusted basis of zero to all trade accounts receivab'e and other
assets which have an adjusted basis of zero to the cash-basis taxpayer.
The liabilities assumed in excess of the assets transferred under this
interpretation result in the recognition of substantial gain in an otherwise
non-recognition transfer under Section 351.
Several arguments are presented in the various cases on point to
overcome the Tax Court's interpretation of the section. In Peter Raich,32
the case cited as controlling in following cases, the taxpayer contended:
[T]hat Congress intended Section 357(c) to apply to a Section 351
exchange only if the liabilities assumed by the corporate transferee
exceed, not only the "adjusted basis of the property transferred," but
also the book value of that property. [and].. . 1In the alternative...
(if 357(c) does apply) the trade accounts receivable had as basis,
.... at least equal to the amount of the trade accounts payable .... 
323
The taxpayer asserted that Section 357(c) should apply only where
320 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 357(c) (1).
321 Treas. Reg. § 1446-1(c) (1) (i). Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable
year in which actually made.
322 Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966),
P23 Id. at 607.
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the transferor derived some economic gain from the transfer.324 The Tax
Court held that a literal interpretation of Sections 351 (e) (1) and 357(c)
compelled application of Section 357(c) to the transaction and that if
Congress desired to limit the applications of the section to those situations
where an economic benefit results, they would have employed the
necessary language.
The fact that the receivables had a book value ... at the time of the
transfer is irrelevant to the disposition of this issue since the pertinent
language of Section 357(c) speaks only in terms of the "adjusted
basis" of the property transferred.
In applying Section 357(c) to the facts herein, we are not unmindful
that the result reached may conflict with the well-established interest
of Congress to foster tax-free business reorganizations. 325
Even though the Tax Court realized its decision would seriously affect the
tax-free incorporation of cash-basis taxpayers it believed the solution to
the problem to be legislative and not judicial.
The majority of the Tax Court's opinion in John P. Bongiovanni is
directed to the attempt by the taxpayer to avoid the result of Raich by
switching to an accrual method of accounting prior to the incorporation.
The taxpayer lost for failure to receive the Commissioner's approval
of the change in accounting methods. The Tax Court cited Peter Raich
as controlling.
On appeal the Second Circuit decided the Tax Court had erred in
its interpretation of Section 357(c) when applied to a tax-free Section 351
transfer of assets by a cash-basis taxpayer to his controlled corporation.3 26
The Second Circuit rejected a literal interpretation of Section 357(c) and
adopted a construction that discounted trade accounts payable as a
"liability," finding that payables of a cash-basis taxpayer are "liabilities"
for accounting purposes but not for tax purposes under Section 357(c).
Recognizing that the problem does not arise in the case of an accrual-basis
taxpayer, the court found no justification for making the method of
accounting chosen become determinative of the tax benefits where the
purpose of the section is to encourage tax-free business reorganizations.
This interpretation is in accord with the express purpose of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code. As stated in the House report Sections 351 to
373 were, "designed to insure that the same tax consequences result from
the different types of transactions which are available to accomplish
324 Testor v. Comm'r, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964). Where the taxpayer was
economically benefitted by the corporate assumption of the liabilities. The examplesset forth in the Treasury Regulations are ones in which the taxpayer realizes an
economic benefit from the transfer. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(2).
325 Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 611 (1966).
326 ]Bongiovanni v, Comm'r, 470 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1972),
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substantially the same result."7 While the court's decision does provide
an equitable result, it strains the section beyond what it was intended
to encompass. However, since Section 357(c) specifically provides
that assets be valued at their "adjusted basis" the only method of
circumventing the problem as viewed by the court was to develop
a "tax" definition of liabilities.
The Tax Court has refused to follow the definition of "liabilities"
expressed in Bongiovanni, and, in Wilford E. Thatcher32 confirmed its
holding in Peter Raich. Thatcher presented arguments similar to those
presented by the taxpayers in Bongiovanni and Raich and an additional
argument based on his partnership status. Section 751 (a) provides that in
the sale or exchange of partnership assets unrealized receivables of the
partnership are valued at market value for purposes of determining
amount of gain or loss on the transaction. Thatcher contended that
receivables should be valued at market for the purposes of a Section 351
reorganization. The Tax Court emphasized that Section 751 was designed
to measure income and not the tax consequences of a transaction subject
to Section 351 and rejected the contention.
The court realized the inequities involved and pointed out that had
the taxpayer been on the accrual method of accounting the problem
would not have arisen. The court further noted that the tax consequences
could have been avoided by withholding the payables and a similar
amount of receivables from the reorganization. In confirming the holding
in the Raich case the court again commented that the changes required
were administrative or legislative and not judicial.
The most reasoned and equitable interpretation of Section 351(c)
appears in the dissenting opinion by Judge Hall in Thatcher. He points
out that if the cash-basis taxpayer transfers payables and an equal amount
of receivables outside of Section 351 there would be no gain realized on
the transaction; however, under the majority's opinion a taxpayer making
a similar exchange with his controlled corporation would have taxable
income equal to the payables transferred. Section 357(c)(1) provides
that the gain shall be treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of
property. The taxpayer should be considered to have made a taxable
"sale" of his receivables for the assumption and payment of his payables
by the corporation. When a cash-method taxpayer sells his receivables
for assumption and payment of his payables, he is as much entitled
to a deduction for payment of the payables as he is accountable for
income on the sale of the receivables.
Nothing in Sections 351 or 357 requires treatment of only one side
of the receivable-payable "sale" as a recognizing transaction. The
327 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
328 Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. No. 4 (Oct. 4, 1973).
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statutory purpose is far better served if payables paid by the
transferee in the taxable year of transfer are treated as deductible
to the transferor to the extent the offsetting receivables are treated
as received by him.32
This analysis does not create the strain upon Section 357(c) that
the interpretation given the word "liabilities" in Bongiovanni created.
Where payables represent ordinary and necessary business expenses they
should be netted against the trade accounts receivable creating no taxable
gain to the extent that receivables offset payables. This interpretation
would place the cash-basis taxpayer on an equal footing with the accrual
taxpayer and would not be disruptive of the purpose of Section 357(c).
Gains recognized on the transfer of encumbered property would still be
taxed as would those where the taxpayer created receivables in the nature
of a promissory note to offset liabilities330 or where the liabilities assumed
exceeded the value of assets transferred.331
The manner in which Section 357(c) is presently being applied by
the courts outside of the Second Circuit will continue to trap unwary
taxpayers until either Judge Hall's interpretation is adopted (unlikely) or
some legislative change occurs (also unlikely). The cash-basis taxpayer
who wishes to incorporate and avoid the Section 357(c) trap has two
options. First, he can withhold payables and sufficient receivables to cover
them from the reorganization. This has the disadvantage of depriving the
new corporation of an often needed cash flow at the start of business.
The alternative is to switch to the accrual method of accounting prior to
reorganization. This may require some planning so that a question of tax
avoidance is not created. However, business reorganizations are usually
considered for some period prior to actual initiation of the plan providing
sufficient time for the changeover.
7.07 Accumulated Earnings. Sections 531 and 532 impose a penalty
upon corporations formed or used for the purpose of avoiding the income
tax by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of distributing
dividends to shareholders. However, a corporation may accumulate
earnings to meet reasonable anticipated future needs of the business.33
2
Inland Terminals, Inc. v. United States 33 held that a wholly owned
subsidiary could accumulate earnings for the anticipated business needs
of its parent.
Is it possible for a corporation to avoid the accumulated earnings
tax by redeeming stock, a portion of which is charged to earnings and
329 Id.
3 30Velma W. Alderman, 55 T.C. 662 (1971).
3 3lTestor v. Comm'r, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
33 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(1).
333Inland Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 477 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1973).
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profits under Section 312(e)? In Ostendori-Morris v. United States,33 4 the
court imposed the tax when earnings and profits were reduced by a
redemption which did not affect the current year's taxable profit. In
a 1973 case, G.P.D. Inc.,3 5 the Tax Court refused to impose the
accumulated earnings tax when the corporation redeemed stock previously
donated to a charitable organization. For the year in question, taxable
income less income taxes and dividends was $211,343. The amount of
redemption properly chargeable to earnings and profits was $432,640,
thereby causing a net decrease in accumulated earnings. The Tax Court
held that a net increase in accumulated earnings is required before the
tax will be imposed.
8.00 Subchapter S Corporations
8.01 Second Class of Stock. After the original promulgation of
Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(g) 336 the IRS took the position that any
obligation that is purported to represent debt but in actuality is found to
represent equity will constitute a second class of stock. This position was
softened somewhat by the 1966 amendment that recognized that if the
debt was held in proportion to the stock held by the shareholders
the debt will be considered a contribution to capital rather than a
second class of stock.337 The regulation has continued to be under
attack since its amendment 3 8 and the Treasury has finally decided
to reconsider Section 1.1371-1(g) due to the number of cases that
have found the section invalid. 339
To attack a corporation's status on the basis of the one class of stock
requirement, the Commissioner has been required to show two facts.
First, that the "debt" held is in actuality equity and not debt. Second,
that the equity interest constitutes a second class of stock. The
Commissioner has generally attempted to apply the "thin capitalization"
doctrine to show that the debt is actually equity. Thin capitalization is a
determinative factor in showing that a corporation has engaged in a tax
avoidance scheme by distributing corporate earnings as interest on debt
instead of as dividends. Several factors determine thin capitalization:
high debt to equity ratio, subordination of the debt to other creditors,
334 Ostendorf-Morris v. United States, 26 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-5369 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
335 G.P.D. Inc., 60 T.C. No. 53 (June 6, 1973).
336 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959).
337 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g), as amended, T.D. 6904, 31 Fed. Reg. 16527 (1966).
338 Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Wis.),
rev'd, 470 F.2d 308, aff'd on rehearing, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-864 (7th Cir.
1973); Shores Realty Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972);
William M. Allison, 57 T.C. 174 (1971); James L. Stinnett, 54 T.C. 221 (1970);
Harbor Properties Inc., 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 562 (1973); H. R. Spinner Corp., 39
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 513 (1970).
339 T.I.R. 1248, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAxES ff 55,385,
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interest based on profits, no fixed maturity, provisions for repayment
or remedies for default. 340
In the principal cases 34 ' the Commissioner was usually successful
in showing that the debt was equity, the courts preferring to consider
the "equity" as a further contribution to capital and not a second
class of stock. 42
We perceive no basis in law for the Commissioner's attempt to inject
the "debt versus equity" analysis into the application of the "one
class of stock" requirement.... We conclude that the legislative use
of the term "stock" foreclosed the Commissioner from granting to
or withholding from a taxpayer favorable Subchapter S income tax
treatment on the basis of that taxpayer's capital structure (i.e., debt
versus equity). s
The finding that the debt versus equity question is not relevant to the
single class of stock requirement of a Subchapter S corporation is
derived from the purpose of the requirement.
[T]he purpose of the single class of stock requirement was none
other than to avoid the administrative complexity in the allocation
of income which would result with more than one class of stock when
preferred dividends were paid in excess of current earnings from
undistributed but taxed prior earnings.3 "
Section 1371 does not concern itself with the method used to capitalize
a small business corporation. The one class of stock requirement was
enacted to avoid administrative problems in the distribution of the
corporation's income. Where the equity is treated as debt by the
Subchapter S corporation the distribution problems do not occur because
"interest" on debt is paid with untaxed earnings.
The IRS first amended Section 1.1371-1(g) of the regulations after
the Tax Court concluded that debt held in the same proportion as the
stock was not a second class of stock.345 In all of the cases cited in
footnote 338 except Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States the debt
was held by the stockholders of the corporation but in disproportionate
3 4 0CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 559 (3d ed. 1973).
341 See note 338 supra.
342 James L Stinnett, 54 T.C. 221, 229 (1970); Harbor Properties, Inc., 42 P-H TAX
CT. MEM. 562, 624 (1973); H. R. Spinner Corp. 39 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 513, 516
(1970).
343Shores Realty Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 1972).
But see Amory Cotton Oil Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1972).
Where the court accepted the relevance of the debit-equity distinction if a tax
avoidance scheme were disclosed, but found no such scheme in Amoy.
344Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-864, 867
(7th Cir. 1973).
34 W. C. Gammon, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
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amounts as compared to their holdings of stock. In each of the cases the
court found that the Commissioner had exceeded his power in applying
regulation 1.1371-1(g) to terminate the Subchapter S status.
The en banc decision in Portage Plastics came as a final blow to the
Commissioner's position as to the application of regulation 1.1371-1(g).
The holders of the debt instruments in Portage Plastics were not
stockholders of the corporation. The court held it was unnecessary to
determine whether the instruments were debt or equity and that even
if they were determined to be equity they should not be considered a
second class of stock within the meaning of the statute. "To the extent
that Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(g) calls for a contrary result, it is
arbitrary and beyond the power of the Commissioner.
' 346
The Treasury has promulgated Technical Information Release
1248347 proposing amendments to regulation 1.1371-1(g). Pending
revision of the regulation the Service will not litigate the issue of whether
obligations which are purported to be debt but are actually equity qualify
as a second class of stock so as to terminate the Subchapter S status.
The position the Service will take in the revision of the regulation is
an open question. The unified position of the courts appears to be that the
debt-equity dichotomy only arises in a tax avoidance situation and not in
the situation under attack-the status of a corporation's Subchapter S
election. The purpose of the "one class of stock" requirement has generally
been found to be the avoidance of administrative problems in the
distribution of the electing corporation's dividends. As long as no
administrative problems are created by the issuance of "debt" the termina-
tion of the corporation's Subchapter S status appears to be unnecessary.
8.02.1 Passive Investment Income. The Tax Court has refused to
follow the termination made by the Fifth Circuit in vacating a Tax Court
decision, House v. Commissioner,3 4 as to the meaning of passive
investment income. In Jasper L. House, Jr.3 49 the Tax Court applied
346 Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-864, 865
(7th Cir. 1973).
347 T.I.R. 1248, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAXES 55, 385.
Pending revision of the regulation, the IRS will not litigate the issue of whether
Subchapter S obligations which purport to represent debt, but which actually
represent equity capital, constitute a second class of stock in cases factually
similar to Amory Cotton Oil Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.
1972); Shores Realty Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972);
Portage Plastics Co., Inc. v. United States ....... F.2d ...... (7th Cir. 1973); and
James L. Stinnett, 54 T.C. 221 (1970).
348 House v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'g, Jasper L. House, Jr., 39
P-H TAx CT. MEM. 588 (1970).
349 Jasper L. House, Jr., 39 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 588 (1970).
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a mechanical-literal reading of Section 1372(e)(5)350 in holding a
corporation's election under Subchapter S is terminated if more than
20 percent of its gross receipts are derived from interest. House contended
that small loan companies are excluded from the application of Section
1372(e)(5) because (1) such companies are actively engaged in the
collection of passive income (interest) and (2) such companies are not
personal holding companies under Section 542. Therefore, they do
not generate personal holding company income as Section 1372(e)35 1 was
originally entitled. House made the further arguments that repayments of
loans should be included in gross receipts and that, in accordance with a
district court's determination in Valley Loan Association v. United
States,152 Treasury Regulation 1.1372-4353 should be held invalid.
In upholding the taxpayer's contentions the circuit court differentiated
between "passive" and "active" passive investment income. The word
interest should be construed in conjunction with the heading of the
section "personal holding company income" or "passive investment
income" under the 1966 Act which modified the language.
We are of the view that the words "personal holding company
income" and "passive investment income" were deliberately employed
by Congress to make clear its legislative purpose. The word "interest"
cannot be read in isolation. To effect termination of subchapter S
status the interest must be part of "personal holding company
income." It was not such; neither did the interest earned by a small
loan company fit the words "passive investment income.
'354
The Tax Court, in two cases presented thus far, T. J. Marshall
3 55
and Joseph B. Zychinski,356 has declined to follow the holdings in
House and Valley Loan.
In 1. J. Marshall petitioner relied on the holding in Valley Loan that
Treasury Regulation 1.1372-4 is invalid insofar as it excludes from gross
receipts the repayment of loans made in the regular course of business.
Marshall and Miller, the owners of Realty Investment Company of
Roswell, Inc. (Realty), were disallowed deductions for the undistributed
350 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (5) (A) Passive Investment Income. "[A]n elec-
tion under subsection (a) made by a small business corporation shall terminate if, for
any taxable year... such corporation has gross receipts more than 20 percent of
which is passive investment income."
351 INT. REv. CODa OF 1954, § 1372(e) (5) (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. 1372(e) (5)
(1966). Personal holding company income. "[I1f... such corporation has gross
receipts more than 20 percent of which is derived from royalties, rents, dividends,
interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities .... "
352 Valley Loan Ass'n v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1966).
353 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (iii) (e) (iv) Gross Receipts. "[G]ross receipts does
not include... amounts received as a repayment of a loan..
354 House v. Comm'r, 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972).
355 1. J. Marshall, 60 T.C. No. 29 (May 21, 1973).
356 Joseph B. Zychinski, 60 T.C. No. 100 (Sept. 20, 1973).
[Vol. 7:2260
72
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss2/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1973
net operating losses of Realty, under a determination by the Commissioner
that Realty was not eligible to report its income as a tax option
corporation under the provisions of Section 1372(2). Realty was licensed
as a small loan company and derived approximately 45 percent of its
income from interest payments. Petitioners argued that if loan repayments
were included in gross receipts the percentage of passive income would
be less than 20 percent and Realty would qualify under Section 1372.
This interpretation was approved in Valley Loan:
There is nothing in subchapter S which specifically excludes from
gross receipts the amount received for repayment of such loans....
the act itself indicates that congress intended Section 1372(e) (5) to
apply only to personal holding company income... [L]oan companies
engaging in activities similar to those of plaintiff have been excluded
by congress from the definition of a personal holding company.
[T]reasury Regulation 1.1372-4 insofar as the defendant
construes it to exclude from gross receipts the repayment of the loans
made and installment contracts acquired by the plaintiff in the
ordinary course of its loan business is contrary to the congressional
act and congressional intent as evidenced by the act and is therefore
invalid as applied to the plaintiff's operation."5 7
The Tax Court in deciding against the taxpayer on the make-up of
gross receipts cites two cases as controlling, Buhler Mortgage Co.3 58 and
Alfred M. Sieh.359 The taxpayer in Buhler Mortgage Co. was engaged in
purchasing deeds of trust and discounting them with various banks. The
court held that the transactions whereby the taxpayer negotiated the notes
were equivalent to a sale of securities and under 1372(e) (5) constituted
"personal holding company income" notwithstanding the fact that gain
on the sale of securities by security dealers was excluded by Section
543(e) (2) from personal holding company income.
In the second case cited, Alfred M. Sieh, the Tax Court held, "Only
the actual amounts of principal payments received during the year are
includable [in gross receipts] if the cash method is employed. '3 60 The
company in Sieh provided financing to prospective purchasers who could
not otherwise finance the purchase of a home. By refinancing the property
to the homeowner at a higher rate of interest, the company was basically
making loans much as Realty did in 1. J. Marshall. How Sieh supports
the court's holding that repayments on loans are not includable in gross
receipts escapes this writer.
Marshall presented the alternative argument that Realty's interest
357 258 F. Supp. at 675.
358 Buhler Mortgage Co., 51 T.C. 971 (1969).
359Alfred M. Sieh, 56 T.C. 1386 (1971), afl'd, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-694 (8th
Cir. 1973).
36056 T.C. at 1387.
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income should not be considered "passive investment income" under
1372(e) (5). Petitioner basing his argument on the previously discussed
House v. Commissioner, the Tax Court declined to follow the holding
of the Fifth Circuit, preferring to uphold the Tax Court decision in
Buhler Mortgage Co.
We therefore respectfully decline to follow the Appeals Court's
holding in the House case and conclude that interest and rental
income are part of "passive investment income" even though the
recipient of such interest or rental income may be actively engaged
in a small loan or real estate business.361
The second case in which House was raised as a defense to the
disallowance of losses incurred by a Subchapter S corporation is Joseph
B. Zychinski.362 The corporation in which Zychinski was a shareholder,
Richter & Co., engaged in the trading of stocks and securities for its own
account and acted as a broker in over-the-counter securities for others.
Zychinski presented to the Tax Court the same arguments asserted in
Marshall and House as to the meaning of "passive investment income."
As expected, the court affirmed its own findings in Buhler Mortgage Co.
Petitioner also argued that the reference to "sales or exchanges of stock
or securities" does not apply to the gross receipts from the sale of
inventory but only to the sale of capital assets. In deciding against
petitioner the court stated: "The basic problem with petitioner's argument
is that the language of Section 1372(e)(5) nowhere limits 'sales or
exchanges of stock or securities' to capital assets, nor does it differentiate
between trade or business activity and nonbusiness activity. ' ' 363
The Tax Court accepts a literal application of Section 1372. The
statute makes no distinction between "passive" versus "active" interest
or the method (activity) employed to generate the corporation's income.
In the court's view whether or not the interest received by loan companies
is considered active or passive it is still interest and specifically included
in the definition of passive investment income contained in Section 1372.
This interpretation by the Tax Court precludes the possibility of a
small loan company qualifying for the Subchapter S tax option. If the
problem that occurred in Marshall should arise again the petitioner
would do well to take his case to District Court for a determination
and avoid the Tax Court if at all possible.
8.02.2 Oil Lease Bonuses v. Royalty. The payment of a "bonus"
upon the execution of an oil and gas lease does not constitute "personal
holding company income." In Swank & Son, Inc.364 the Commissioner
3611. J. Marshall, 60 T.C. No. 29 (May 21, 1973).
362 Joseph B. Zychinski, 60 T.C. No. 100 (Sept. 20, 1973).
363 Id.
364 Swank & Son, Inc. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 897 (D. Mont. 1973).
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determined that a bonus payment upon the execution of an oil and gas
lease was personal holding company income under 1372(c) (5) and
terminated plaintiff's Subchapter S election. This holding is in accordance
with Commissioner v. Clarion Oil Co. 3 65 wherein the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held, "[T]he word 'bonus,' as used in
oil lease parlance is, in relation to federal taxation, included in the
word 'royalty.'" This holding was followed by the Fifth Circuit in
Bayon Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner.66
The District Court in Swank arrived at a different conclusion:
"the terms 'bonus' and 'royalty' had definite meanings in the oil and
gas industry-the words did not mean the same thing."36 7 As to whether
Congress failed to include the word "bonus" as personal holding company
income because it believed it to be included in the word "royalty" or that
it intended bonus should not be included at all, the court stated:
As between the proposition that a Congress knowledgeable about
oil and gas terminology stretched the meaning of the word "royalty"
to include "bonus" and the proposition that the word "bonus" did
not appear because it was not the purpose to treat as bonus or
personal holding company income, I would choose the latter.3 68
The holding in Swank is in disagreement with analogous holdings of
the Supreme Court that as to depletion deductions a bonus will be
considered as an advance royalty.36 9 The court in Swank looked to state
decisions and industry meanings to determine whether "bonus" was
included in "royalty." In construing the tax laws the usually accepted
meanings of words or the words in state decisions are not controlling in
those instances where to follow such meaning would impair the uniformity
of the federal tax laws. In view of the decisions in other circuits and the
implications arising from analogous Supreme Court decisions the District
Court for Montana may have erred in the exclusion of "bonus" payments
from personal holding company income.
The Montana Court does make one interesting comment that goes to
the whole subject of passive income. The bargaining for oil and gas leases
is an integral part of land management and must be actively pursued. The
court differentiates between "bonus" and "royalty" on the basis that a
"bonus" is active and a "royalty" is passive income. The court defines
passive income 'as that which "comes to the owner of the right without
the expenditure of effort or the exercise of judgment on the part of the
365 Commissioner v. Clarion Oil Co., 148 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 881 (1945).
3 66Bayon Verret Land Co. v. Comm'r, 450 F.2d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1971).
367 362 F. Supp. at 897.
368 Id. at 900.
369 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Palmas v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551(1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
Winter, 1974]
75
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
AKRON LAW REVIEW
owner .... ,,370 If this definition can be given weight it would apply
to the small loan business or the active trading of securities both of
which require a considerable expenditure of both effort and judgment
on the part of the owner.
8.03 Creation of Basis to Absorb Loss. The income of an electing
small business corporation is taxable to the shareholders of the corporation
in proportion to their pro rata share of the corporate stock.37 The income
of the corporation may be offset by the net operating losses of the
corporation to the extent cf the adjusted basis of the shareholder's
investment. 37 2 The adjusted basis of the shareholder's investment includes
the adjusted basis of the stock of the corporation and the adjusted
basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder. The
shareholder's basis in stock may be increased by the amount of any
undistributed dividends taxable to the shareholder 373 or decreased by an
amount equal to the shareholder's portion of any net operating losses for
any taxable year attributed to such stock. The basis of any indebtedness
will also be reduced by the losses, but only to the extent that such amount
exceeds the shareholder's basis in the stock of the corporation. 374 To the
extent that the corporation's losses exceed the basis of the shareholder's
investment they are not deductible in future years and are lost.
375
The question arises whether the stockholder can, in a year of heavy
losses, increase the adjusted basis of his investment to absorb the loss
passed by purchasing additional stock for promissory notes. This method
was attempted in Silverstein v. United States.37 6 Silverstein's Subchapter S
corporation's stock showed a basis of $1,000, the corporation's net
operating losses for the year would greatly exceed this amount. Three
days before the end of the taxable year the stockholders purchased for
promissory notes an additional $200,000 worth of stock. The Commis-
sioner considered the transaction a sham and the district court agreed.
There was no "actual economic outlay" involved in the transaction. In
the ensuing six years only one interest payment was made and no
payments on the principal. The only other indebtedness of the corporation
was already personally indorsed by Silverstein so that the additional
liability created by the notes had no economic substance. One of the
370 362 F. Supp. at 898.
371 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373.
372 Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374.
373 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1373.
374 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1376(b) (2).
375 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c).
376 Silverstein v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1972).
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oldest precepts of tax law requires that sham transactions be disregarded
for tax purposes.
377
The stockholders in Wheat v. United States378 asserted their personal
guarantees of the Subchapter S corporation's outstanding loans constituted
indebtedness owing from the corporation to the stockholders. Further, this
indebtedness increased the shareholders' basis in their investment allowing
a greatly increased writeoff of the corporation's losses. The court disposed
of the taxpayer's assertion with a summary judgment for the government.
There was no debt to the shareholders until the corporation defaulted on
the loans and the shareholders were held liable on their personal guaran-
tees. The court relied on holdings that the term "indebtedness" implies
an existing unconditional and legally enforceable obligation to pay.379
The shareholders contended that their Stockholder's Agreement
established the requisite obligation to pay. The terms of the agreement
required the stockholders to make additional contributions to capital
whenever the financing of a project necessitated. The agreement was
never employed, the corporation acquiring funds through bank loans. The
agreement notwithstanding, the shareholders assumed no actual liability
until such time as the corporation defaulted, and this never occurred.
The shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation can increase their
basis in the corporate stock to enable them to absorb corporate losses.
This can be accomplished through the corporation's retention of income,
additional purchases of stock or the creation of actual indebtedness by
the corporation to the shareholder, but the method employed must have
economic substance to avoid being categorized as a sham transaction.
9.00 Inventory
9.01 Full Absorption Regulations. With the promulgation of the
full absorption regulations,380 the Commissioner has extended an invitation
to attorneys to join hands with certified public accountants and together
wade into the deep, dark, murky waters of the world of cost accounting,
where they will encounter strange creatures such as prime cost, direct cost,
fixed and variable costs, period costs, practical capacity, etc., not fully
realizing whether they are entering a quagmire or merely a bottomless pit.
The regulation places great stress upon the determination of the
year-end inventory valuation for manufacturers, since ending inventory
is a crucial item in calculating taxable income. The cost of goods
manufactured and sold varies inversely and taxable income varies
377 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U.S. 331 (1945).
378 Wheat v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
379 Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Virgin, 230 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1956).
38o Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11.
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directly with inventory. Therefore, if ending inventory is understated,
the cost of goods manufactured and sold will be overstated, thereby
understating taxable profit and, of course, depriving the federal
government of their share of the profit.
The regulation requires the full absorption of both direct and indirect
costs for calculating inventory values, so as to conform to the best account-
ing practices and to clearly reflect income, as required by Section 471.
Previously, Regulation 1.471-2(0(6) and (7) refused to permit the direct
cost or prime cost method to be used. The direct cost method segregates
indirect costs between fixed and variable costs, allocating only the variable
cost to inventory and expensing the fixed costs. The prime cost method
results in all indirect costs, whether fixed or variable, being expensed.
The regulation defines direct production costs as "those costs which
are incident to and necessary for production or manufacturing operations
or processes and are components of the cost of either direct labor or
direct material. ' ' 381 Direct labor includes labor performed directly on
the specific product plus "overtime pay, vacation, holiday, sick pay, wage
continuation under Section 105(d), shift differential, payroll taxes and
payments to a supplemental unemployment benefit plan paid or incurred
on behalf of employees engaged in direct labor.' ' 382 Direct material is
defined in Section 471-3, but basically includes those materials which
become an integral part of the product. All direct costs must be
considered in determining inventory values.
Indirect production costs are defined to include "all costs which
are incident to and necessary for production or manufacturing operations
or processes other than direct production costs. '
' 3n
Three categories of indirect costs are specified. Category 1 includes
those elements of cost which must be included in the computation of
inventoriable costs to the extent they are incident to the production
process. Included are:
(a) repair expenses, (b) maintenance, (c) utilities, such as heat,
power and light, (d) rent, (e) indirect labor and production
supervisory wages, including basic compensation, overtime pay,
vacation and holiday pay, sick leave pay (other than payments
pursuant to a wage continuation plan under section 105(d), shift
differential, payroll taxes, and contributions to a supplemental
unemployment benefit plan, (f) indirect materials and supplies,
(g) tools and equipment not capitalized, and (h) costs of quality
control and inspection. 384
381 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (b) (2).
382 Id.
3 83 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (b) (3).
384 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (c) (2) (i).
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Category 2, listed below, sets forth those costs not required to be
included in the inventory costs regardless of taxpayer's treatment of such
items on the financial statement:
(a) marketing expenses, (b) advertising expenses, (c) selling
expenses, (d) other distribution expenses, (e) interest, (f) research
and experimental expenses including engineering and product
development expenses, (g) losses under Section 163 and the
regulations thereunder, (h) percentage depletion in excess of cost
depletion, (i) depreciation and amortization reported for Federal
income tax purposes in excess of depreciation reported by the
taxpayer in his financial reports, (j) income taxes attributable to
income received on the sale of inventory, (k) pension contributions
to the extent they represent past services cost, (1) general and
administrative expenses incident to and necessary for the taxpayer's
activities as a whole rather than to production or manufacturing
operations or processes, and salaries paid to officers attributable to
the performance of services which are incident to and necessary for
the taxpayer's activities taken as a whole rather than to production
or manufacturing operations or processes.
3n
Category 3 lists items which may be includable in inventory costs
depending upon their treatment in taxpayer's financial statement. These
costs include, but are not limited to the following items related to and
necessary for production or manufacturing: (a) taxes which are deductible
other than income taxes (e.g., real property taxes imposed on production
facilities and personal property taxes imposed on inventory), (b) depreci-
ation reported in financial reports and cost depletion, (c) pension and
profit-sharing contributions to the extent they represent current service
costs and other employee benefits, (d) costs attributable to strikes,
rework labor, scrap and spoilage, (e) factory and administrative expenses,
(f) officers' salaries which are incident to and necessary for the production
or manufacturing operations or processes, and (g) insurance costs.
386
Other costs not specifically enumerated, fall into the category to which
they are most similar.
The previously mentioned indirect costs must be allocated to products
in ending inventory by a procedure which fairly apportions costs among
the items produced.38 7 The regulation permits the allocation to be based
on either the use of a manufacturing burden rate method or the standard
cost method aSM However, variances from the predetermined burden rate
and standard cost must also be apportioned to inventory.
The regulation permits a portion of the fixed indirect (overhead)
385 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (c) (2) (ii).
388 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (c) (2) (iii).
387 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (d) (1).
388 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(d)(2) & (3),
Winter, 1974]
79
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
costs to be deducted currently when production falls below the practical
capacity of the plant or facility. 8 9 Practical capacity is either maximum
or theoretical capacity based on the normal work week and the regular
number of shifts, reduced by holidays, vacation time, down time and
other unavoidable interruptions.
All manufacturers are required to adopt full absorption costing. 9 0
However, an election to change during the two-year transitional period,
after September 19, 1973, and before September 19, 1975, qualifies the
taxpayer for special treatment. Taxpayers so electing obtain the benefits
of spreading an increase in income, resulting from the inventory
revaluation, forward over a ten-year period. Further, the election
tolls action on issues currently raised by the IRS during an audit
concerning inventory costing.
This regulation has far-reaching consequences upon the cost
accounting system of every manufacturing company, whether it be
Wagner Machine Shop or General Motors. In the future, litigation
will abound over interpretations of this section due to the complexity and
volume of the potential issues which may be raised by the Commissioner.
10.00 Capital Gains and Losses
10.01 Repayment of Insider Profits. One of the questions most
widely litigated involves the treatment of repayments of funds previously
taxed at capital gains rates.39' The question arises from a rather "invol-
untary" repayment of gains from inside profits and other "fraudulent"
transactions under threat of suit by the S.E.C. or some other injured
party. The taxpayers originally treated the gains as long-term capital gains
but deducted the repayments as ordinary business losses resulting in a tax
gain on the overall transaction. The question was presented to the
Supreme Court under a different factual situation in Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner.392 The rule set forth in Arrowsmith was made clear in
another Supreme Court decision United States v. Skelly Oil Co.
The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see; if money was
taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be
accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally
deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to
ordinary income. The Court in Arrowsmith was unwilling to infer
that Congress intended such a result. 93
389 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (d) (4).
390 Treas. Reg. § 1.4 71-11 (e).
391Anderson v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971);Kimbell v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 1232 (D.C. Tex. 1973); Nathan Cummings,60 T.C. No. 11 (April 23, 1973), afl'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. No. 1 (Oct. 2, 1973).39 2 Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
9 VpJited St ts v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U:S. 678, 685 (1969).
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To apply the rationale, the two transactions, original receipt of funds
and a subsequent repayment, must be integrated and viewed as one
transaction. The Tax Court has refused to find such a relationship arising
from a violation of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.394 In these cases395 the taxpayer, a director or officer of the
corporation, has usually asserted that the repayments were made for
valid business reasons, to protect his business reputation and to avoid
future litigation. The taxpayer was deemed to have recognized capital
gains in the capacity of a shareholder but paid the alleged insider's profits
as an officer of the corporation. There being no connection between the
two acts, the Tax Court asserted the Arrowsmith rule does not apply.
The circuit courts have consistently found the Tax Court's construc-
tion of the transactions unpersuasive. The Seventh Circuit found "the
16(b) payments were 'inextricably intertwined with taxpayer's... stock
transactions.' Bifurcating the sale and payments smacks of artificiality, and
characterizing the sale-purchase occurrence as without tax significance
could only have been done in a vacuum."
39 There is no distinction
between the taxpayer's status at the time of the stock transaction
and the subsequent repayment of the profits. The taxpayer sold 
the
stock as an insider and the demand for repayment was addressed 
to
him in the same capacity.
In all of these cases the repayments were "voluntary" in that the
16(b) violation had only been alleged and no suit was ever filed for
the recovery of the profits. From this the Tax Court determined that 
the
taxpayer's motive in making the repayments could have only been 
to
preserve his employment and to avoid injury to his business reputation.
That the taxpayers were liable under 16(b) was unquestioned and there
was no reason to allow the taxpayer an ordinary deduction merely
because he paid promptly instead of awaiting litigation.
The purpose of 16(b) is to prevent unfair profit by the use of
information available only to an insider. Whether the insider actually 
had
such information is immaterial under the statute. The purpose of 16(b)
would be severely undermined by allowing the repayment of the profits
394 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1934).
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by 
reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase 
and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer....
395Nathan Cummings, 60 T.C. No. 11 (April 23, 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 61 T.C.
No. 1 (Oct. 2, 1973); James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d
1304 (7th Cir. 1973); William E. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259
(6th Cir. 1970).
396 Anderson v. Comm'r, 489 F,2d 1307 (7th Cir. 1973),
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to be deductible as an ordinary business expense. If the ordinary loss is
allowed the government is in effect subsidizing the repayment to the
extent of the difference in the ordinary and capital gains tax rates. Therehardly seems to be a case, under the view taken by Tax Court, that
would not qualify for an ordinary deduction, because the taxpayer will
always honestly be able to assert that a finding of insider profiteering
would damage his business reputation.
A District Court in the Fifth Circuit has applied the rationale of the
other circuits in the previous cases in holding that a settlement underthreat of suit is a capital loss. 397 The taxpayer sold two leases on oil wellsthat were illegally slanted and treated the profits as capital gains. A bankthat held a security interest in the oil production from the wellsthreatened a lawsuit against the taxpayer as a result of the purchaser'sdefault. The bank asserted that the taxpayer knew the wells were illegallyproducing when he sold the leases and that taxpayer also knew the bank
was providing the financing. The taxpayer agreed to settle the lawsuit
"because a lawsuit, even though it be without basis, charging him withfraud would have an adverse effect on his reputation and operations inthe oil and gas business."398 The court found Arrowsmith to be clearly
applicable-to hold otherwise would allow the taxpayer a doublededuction. The original payment, treated as a capital gain, and the
subsequent settlement (repayment) arose from the same transaction-the
sale of the oil leases. As a result the loss must be treated in the same
manner as the original gain-as a capital transaction.
A taxpayer who is involved in a transaction similar to those set forth
above should choose the Tax Court as the forum to litigate his case. TheTax Court appears to be rather adamant in its position. Even though it
agreed to rehear Cummings in light of the reversal of its opinion inAnderson, the court maintained its position that the repayments were an
ordinary business expense. If Cummings is appealed it will be to theSecond Circuit and in view of the holdings in three other circuits it seemslikely that the Tax Court will again be reversed.
10.02 Corporate Loss on Sale of Non-Business Property. Can a
corporation sustain a loss that would not be deductible under Section165? The Seventh Circuit in International Trading Co. v. Commissioner 99
reversed a Tax Court decision and found the answer to be clearly no. In
a preceding case, International Trading Co. v. Commissioner,400 involving
the same property, it was held that International could not deduct expenses
397 Kimbell v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
398 Id. at 1233.
399 International Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 484 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 57T.C. 455 (1971).400 International Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1960), aff'g, 27
P-H TAX CT. MEM. 104 (1958).
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and maintenance cost or depreciate property used as a resort for the
corporation's employees. The property was not property used in the trade
or business. In 1957 International sold the resort property sustaining a
$300,000 loss on the transaction. A deduction in this amount was taken
on the corporation's tax return as provided in Section 165(a). 401 In an
attempt to be consistent with its prior holding in the first International
case the Tax Court disallowed the loss deduction on the sale of the
non-business property.
The circuit court found clearly dispositive differences between the
sections of the Code relating to expenses and depreciation and Section
165 relating to losses. The general rule allows a deduction for all
uncompensated losses and only limits deductions in the case of
individuals.402 The Tax Court asserted that to allow the deduction would
in effect give the taxpayer the benefit of depreciation on the property. The
circuit court recognized this fact, but found "no license for judicial
legislation in the fact that a taxpayer may achieve benefits under
one section of the Code when what might seem to be the same benefits
are denied under another section. ' 403
10.03 Sale of a Patent Pending. Would-be inventors who contem-
plate a sale of their patentable invention to a controlled corporation
should make the transfer prior to receipt of the patent. A patent is a
depreciable asset.404 Under Section 1239 gain on the sale of depreciable
property to a controlled corporation will be treated as ordinary income. A
mere application for a patent does not constitute depreciable property
and therefore does not come under Section 1239.40 5 A patent application
at some point in its processing does become sufficiently mature to be
treated as a patent. In Stahl v. Commissioner42 a patent application was
considered matured after the taxpayer received notification that some
of his claims appeared allowable. Therefore, waiting until the application
has been approved, even if only in part, may prove fatal as to capital
gains treatment.
10.04 Sale of Dirt. Royalty payments under a mineral lease are
considered ordinary income. 407 Normally, the vendor's receipts depend
401 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165. "(a) There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."
402 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c).
403 484 F.2d at 711.
404Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(3). "...an intangible asset may be the subject of a
depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights."
405 Chu v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973).
406 Stahl v. Comm'r, 442 F.2d 324, 328 (7th Cir. 1971).
407 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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upon the actual amount of minerals removed.4'm However, to achieve
capital gains treatment, the receipts must be solely dependent upon the
vendee's right to remove materials from the property and not the amount
he actually removes.
409
In Richard Ellis,410 the taxpayer contracted for the construction of
a pond and sold the dirt extracted to the contractor. The trial court
found the vendor's receipts depended solely upon the actual amount
of dirt removed and were ordinary income. However, the Seventh Circuit
determined, in an unreported decision, that the dimensions of the pond
were sufficient to show the exact amount of dirt purchased, indicating an
unconditional sale of mineral rights as opposed to royalty payments. The
court accorded the transaction capital gains treatment.4m
10.05 Sale of Partnership Interest. The sale or exchange of a
partner's entire interest has been treated as a capital gain or loss since the
interest in a partnership is considered a capital asset.412 A sale by a partner
closes the firm's taxable year as to him and at this date his distributive
share of the earnings is determined.4m The gain or loss realized is
computed by the difference between the amount realized and the adjusted
basis of the partner's interest.
414
In a recent case 4' 5 two promoters agreed with an oil company to
build a processing plant and supply the company's gas needs. The oil
company entered a limited partnership agreement under the stipulation
that the partners provide 40 percent (20 percent by each) of the
financing needed for construction. When the promoters' financing did not
materialize, the company brought out the entrepreneurs for $50,000 each,
the latter relinquishing their rights and interests in the joint venture. Each
reported $47,000 as capital gain. The IRS contended that the $100,000
was payment for services, thus ordinary income. The Tax Court found
this a sale of a capital asset from which capital gains treatment evolved. It
found the sale or exchange requirement met when the partner's right
to share in the project as an equity holder was terminated.48
40 8Comnmissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Rutledge v.
United States, 428 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1970); Laudenslager v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d
686 (3d Cir. 1962).
409Richard Ellis, 56 T.C. 81 (1965). See Laudenslager v. Comm'r, 305 F.2d 686
(3d Cir. 1962).
410 56 T.C. 81 (1965).
411 Ellis v. Comm'r, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAXES 60,320 (7th Cir. 1973).
412 Morse v. United States, 371 F.2d 474 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Forman v. Comm'r, 352
F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Shapiro, 178 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Adamson, 161 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1947).
413 Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1 (c) (2).
414 Treas. Reg. § 1.705-1 (a).
U15 William R. Crisp, 42 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 25 (1973).
416 Norman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961).
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A wise promoter, who is fortunate enough to find a willing investor
who will buy out the promoter's rights, may expect a capital gains
treatment once sufficient evidence is presented to show a sale or exchange
occurred. The evidence will frustrate a counter argument that the purchase
price was payment for services disguised as the sale of a capital asset.
10.06 Installment Sales. A taxpayer, who qualifies under Section
453, can avoid the sometimes harsh consequences of full realization of
gain on the sale of real or personal property by structuring an installment
sale. Section 453 is limited to the following transactions: (1) sales by
dealers in personal property who regularly sell on the installment plan, and
(2) casual sales of non-inventory personal property for a price in excess
of $1,000, and of real property, if payments do not exceed 30 percent of
the selling price in the year of sale. The sale must be satisfied by at least
two payments made in separate years; however, the first payment need not
occur in the year of sale. 41 7 While the provisions appear self explanatory,
the taxpayer who elects to be taxed under Section 453 should be aware
that traps do exist.
The 30 percent limitation in the year of sale presents such a trap.
Payments made in prior years that are applied to the selling price are
included in the payments made in the year of sale. 41 8 Assume the selling
price is $100,000 and on December 20th purchaser makes a $5,000
forfeitable down payment, but the sale is not completed until the following
year. Seller elects to make an installment sale and requests that $29,000
be paid at closing, not realizing that the down payment is considered
part of the first installment. Since the sum of the payments exceeds
30 percent of the selling price in the year of sale, the taxpayer may
not elect to be taxed under Section 453. The result is that the entire
gain on the sale will be taxable in the year of sale, even though the
seller has not received full payment.
If the purchaser assumes a mortgage encumbering the property, to
the extent that the mortgage exceeds the seller's adjusted basis, such
assumption of liability by the purchaser constitutes a payment in the year
of sale. 419 The calculation of the seller's adjusted basis in the property has
a direct effect on the amount of payment made in the year of sale and
whether the 30 percent limitation is met. The Tax Court in Walter
Kirschenmann 42 held that selling cost should be deducted from the total
selling price and not added to the seller's adjusted basis. The Ninth
417Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1283 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Rev.
Rul. 462, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 107.
418 Rev. Rul. 73-396, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 37, at 8.
4 19 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c).
42OWalter Kirschenmann, 57 T.C. 524 (1972), rev'd, Kirschenmann v. Comm'r,
CCH 1973 U.S. TAX CAs. 9799 (9th Cir. Nov. 11, 1973).
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Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court and held that selling expenses are
an adjustment to seller's basis in the property.
The Commissioner contended that the inclusion of selling expense in
adjusted basis causes internal inconsistencies in the regulations. Treasury
Regulation Section 1.453-1(b)(1) defines gross profit as selling price
less adjusted basis and further that gross profit is then "reduced by
commissions and other selling expenses for the purpose of determining the
proportion of installment payments returnable as income." 4n A second
inconsistency is created in Treasury Regulation Section 1.453-4(c). The
regulation provides, "Commissions and other selling expenses paid or
incurred by the vendor shall not reduce the amount of the payments .... ,"422
Since the excess of assumed mortgage over basis is a payment in the year
of sale, adding selling cost to basis will reduce the amount of the
payment in the year of sale.
The Ninth Circuit held that the inconsistencies were created by the
measure of the term "adjusted basis" in the regulations and stated:
[W]e decline to adopt a meaning of "adjusted basis" that is contrary
to Subsections 1011 and 1016 of the Code in order to rectify the
inconsistencies.
We do not hold that the Section 1016 meaning of "adjusted
basis" is always controlling when that term is used in a Treasury
Regulation. We hold only that Treasury Regulation Section 1.453-4
(c) does not present an appropriate case for departing from the
Section 1016 definition. 423
If no interest is provided for in the sales agreement interest will be
imputed under Section 483.424 The selling price will be reduced by the
amount of interest imputed, thus, if the initial payment was precisely 30
percent of the total selling price, the actual payment in the year of sale
would exceed 30 percent and the Section 453 election would be disallowed.
The interest imputed is treated as ordinary income, however, if the
sale is exempted under Section 483 (f) the seller may receive capital gains
treatment. The taxpayer in Busse v. Commissioner2 sold a patent in a
transaction described by Section 1235, but was precluded from treatment
under that section because the taxpayer was "related" to the purchaser.
The court upheld the taxpayer's contention that interest could not be
imputed to the sale because of the protection offered by Section 483(0(4),
even though he was required to establish capital gains treatment under
421 Treas. Regs. § 1.453-1 (b) (1).
422 Treas. Regs. § 1.453-4(c).
42 CCH 1973 U.S. TAx CAS. % 9799 (9th Cir. Nov. 11, 1973).
424 The present rate at which interest is imputed is 5 percent. If the contract calls for
at least 4 percent no interest will be imputed. Treas. Regs. § 1.483-1.
425 Busse v. Comm'r, 479 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1973).
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Sections 1221 and 1222. The court found the regulations on Section
1235426 to be ambiguous when compared with the plain meaning of the
section, and to that extent the regulations are not controlling.
Difficulties sometimes arise as to what constitutes a payment in the
year of sale. Where an initial payment is made and the purchaser remains
obligated to make payments over a period of future years Section 453
would seem to apply. In one situation the purchaser paid the purchase
price into escrow to be paid out over a six-year period, and continued to
be liable on all unpaid installments. Even so, the IRS held the transaction
was complete when the funds were deposited with the escrow agent and
the sale did not qualify as an installment sale.427 The proceeds of the sale
were constructively received by the seller; it is immaterial that the seller
agreed to allow a third party to hold the proceeds and to pay them to the
taxpayer at a later date.428 In a second situation after the initial payment,
pursuant to a contract, the seller accepted nine equal interest-bearing
notes due over the following nine years. In this matter the IRS held the
sale qualified for installment treatment. 42 9 Although Section 1.453-4 of
the Treasury Regulations provides that the vendor's interest must be
protected by a mortgage or lien, the notes were held sufficient even
though the property was transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. The
seller retained no interest in the property, and his only recourse was on
the notes of the purchaser. In the year of sale the seller has received little
more in the first situation than in the second. In the first the risk factor is
less, but in the event the escrow agent fails to make the payments when
due the purchaser remains obligated. The purchaser's obligation in the
second situation is continuous and primary from the date of sale.
The differences are not so great as to require a different result.
11.00 Tax Credits
11.01 Investment Credit Carryback and Carryover-Cooperatives.
Normally investment tax credits can be carried back three years and
carried forward seven years, subject to certain limitations. In a case of
first impression, Helena Cotton Oil Co., Inc.,4 0 the Tax Court held that
the credit available to a cooperative in a year in which it had no income
cannot be carried back or carried over. Section 46(d) limits the carryover
or carryback available to certain classes of taxpayers. The ratable share
available to a cooperative is determined by a ratio, the numerator of
which is its taxable income. If the numerator of a ratio is zero, any
amount multiplied by the ratio will result in an indeterminate result.
426 Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b) (4).
427 Rev. Rul. 73-451, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 44, at 11.
428 Harris v. Comm'r, 477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1973).
429 Rev. Rul. 73-396, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 39, at 12.
430 Helena Cotton Oil Co., Inc., 60 T.C. No. 16 (April 25, 1973).
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The court held that since the result is indeterminate the taxpayer cannot
show what amount its ratable share of the investment is. Therefore, no
carryover or carryback is permissible.
Normally a cooperative receives only a small investment credit
because only a small part of its income is taxed to the cooperative, 43 1
the excess credit being lost. The Tax Court's decision is interesting
and mathematically correct.
12.00 Privilege
12.01 Attorney-Accountant Client Privilege. A fundamental element
of an attorney's professional responsibility is the preservation of his
confidential communications with his client.4 2 The policy reason for the
privilege is the encouragement of open and frank consultation between
the attorney and client, absent a fear that what is said may later be
disclosed.433 Courts confronted with this issue often dwell on the scope
and breadth of the privilege, apparently presuming its existence. 434 The
"federal rule" for the privilege is attributed to United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., an anti-trust proceeding which recognized the
existence of the privilege, if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 43
Section 7602 of the Code has served as the avenue from which
the IRS has questioned the attorney-client relationship and privilege. The
statute provides in part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return,...
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate
is authorized-
4n INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1382.
432See generally Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Attorney and Client, 16 CALEF. L. Ray. 487 (1928); Cohen, Accountant's Work
Papers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21 TAx L. REv. 183 (1966).
433 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 2291 (Rev. ed. 1961).
434 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951(1963); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950).
435 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-359 (D. Mass.
1950). See generally Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investiga-
tions, 19 TAx L. REv. 405 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Lofts].
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(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or matetial to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax... or any person
having possession, custody or care of books of account containing
entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax... or any
other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to
appear ... and to produce such books, papers, records or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under
oath as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
43 6
The exact scope of the attorney-client privilege has not been
uniformly defined to date since the choice of law has resulted in conflict
among the circuits. In Colton v. United States,
437 the Second Circuit
sustained its prior position 438 that the question of privilege, in a case
involving federal income tax investigations, is a matter of federal law. This
contradicts the Ninth Circuit's position finding state law determinative.43
9
When a taxpayer selects an attorney to complete his tax returns and
to prepare sundry other documents, the issue is neatly drawn as to whether
the privilege will extend to these papers and work products within the
attorney's possession. Application of the privilege to the client's identity,
440
the nature of the services rendered, fees charged and general tax records
have been successfully resisted by the IRS.
However, the preparation of tax returns and the rendering of tax
advice have been found to constitute a substantial part of the services
rendered by an attorney as a part of his professional competence. In
Colton, they were described as prima facie subject to the attorney-client
privilege. The statement, however, was not without qualification, "particu-
larly in -the case of an attorney preparing a tax return" where a great deal
of the information communicated "is not intended to be confidential, but
rather is given for transmittal by the attorney to others-for example, for
inclusion in the tax return.""' Furthermore, the individual asserting the
privilege must show conclusively that the matters were communicated to
4N INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602 (1954).
437 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951(1963).
438 In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953). Accord,
Falsome v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Brunner,
200 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1953).
439 United States v. Dickinson, 308 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1969); Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
4 OTillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1965); accord, in re Wasserman,
198 F. Supp. 564 (D. D.C. 1961).
W 306 F.2d at 638.
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the attorney in his professional capacity.442 This alone may be an awesome
burden of proof. In United States v. Gurtner,443 the court found that if a
timely objection is not raised by the taxpayer as to the admissibility of
certain evidence to which the privilege might apply, the objection is
waived. The taxpayer had been advised by his attorney to consult with
an accountant. Even though a working relationship existed between both
the attorney and the accountant the privilege was extended only to the
confidential communication seeking legal advice from an attorney. Thus,
where only an accounting service is sought, the privilege may not exist.
Consequently, an interesting dilemma is presented when an attorney
is employed to function both as a legal consultant and as an accountant.
Though it may appear difficult, if not impossible, to separate the
communications made to him in each of these capacities, the privilege is
necessarily limited to those communications occurring only during the
rendition of legal services. In Olender v. United States, 444 the attorney-
accountant was employed to prepare a net worth statement, following the
initiation of an investigation by the IRS. The district court held that
testimony concerning accounting matters was not privileged. This was
premised upon the court's finding that he had been employed primarily as
an accountant; and this finding was supported by the Ninth Circuit. This
rationale seems to indicate that the preparation of a federal income tax
return is not a legal service to which the attorney-client privilege applies.
Further, if the attorney is also an accountant the inference arises that
while preparing a client's income tax return the individual is not acting
as an attorney. Thus, the argument against application of the privilege is
seemingly strengthened. -5
A further extension of this dilemma arises when the attorney, though
actually rendering legal services to which the privilege applies, is consulted
after the taxpayer confers with an accountant as occurred in United States
v. Kovel.446 A rather arbitrary line was admittedly drawn by the court
between a situation where a client communicates first to his own
accountant (a non-privileged communication) and an attorney is later
consulted on the same matter, and situations where in the first instance
the client consults an attorney while the client's accountant is present. In
442 Lowy v. Comm'r, 262 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1959), where the attorney and client
were mutually engaged in business transactions. Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d281 (5th Cir. 1953), where the attorney acquired real estate for his client. McFee
v. United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1933), where the attorney executed financial
transactions for the client, similar to services a banker might provide.
443 United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973).
444 OIender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
445 In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). The privilege was held to be inappli-
cable to communications to one acting as both attorney and accountant, when made
to facilitate the auditing of the client's books. See Lofts supra note 435, at 419.
445 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
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the latter situation the communications are privileged. The distinction
was found to be, "[T]he inevitable consequence of ... reconcil[ing] the
absence of a privilege.., of the client and lawyer under conditions where
the lawyer needs outside help." 447 This seemingly contradicts the rationale
of United States v. Cote448 where the privilege was extended to memo-
randa and working papers prepared for the taxpayer by his accountant
at the attorney's request so as to render legal advice concerning the
advisability of filing an amended tax return.
In addition to contentions of privileged communication between
attorney and client, significant constitutional issues are raised with respect
to self-incrimination. In Couch v. United States,"9 the taxpayer challenged
a summons directing her accountant to produce business records acquired
for preparation of her tax returns. The taxpayer invoked her fifth
amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to prevent
production of her business and tax records. However, both the district
court and the circuit court concluded that the privilege was unavailable.
The Supreme Court held that since the taxpayer had voluntarily parted
with possession of these records, there was no personal compulsion against
producing the records. Since much of the information in the records was
to be disclosed in income tax returns, there was no legitimate expectation
of privacy barring production. Therefore, possession, not ownership,
appears to be the catalyst supporting a self-incrimination argument. This
conclusion is supported in United States v. White450 which denied a
claim of privilege against self-incrimination because the taxpayer did not
possess any of the documents sought by the IRS. The taxpayer's attorney
had maintained possession for an extended period of time; a point used
to defeat a constructive possession argument.
With respect to the privileged communication enjoyed in certain
select professions, practitioners may be shocked to learn of a recent
decision in Texas. A startling announcement in McNatt v. United States
may signal the end of at least one area of preferred treatment. The court
declared: "Plaintiff may not claim a bookie-client privilege." 451
447 Id. at 922.
448 United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
449 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
450 United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
451 McNatt v. United States, 32 Am. Fed. Tax 12d 73-5733 (D. Tax 1973).
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